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                                                     ABSTRACT 
 
 
The socio-economic dimension of conflicts has enjoyed increasing attention in 
research dealing with the dynamics of contemporary conflict. The underlying 
assumption of this study is that the socio-economic dimension of conflict can be 
hugely informative in terms of providing an understanding as to why peace 
agreements fail and in that sense can contribute to the resolution of conflicts if taken 
into account during the formulation of peace agreements. This study explores the way 
in which conflict theory has dealt with conflict and determines to what degree peace 
agreements in the Sudan have taken into consideration the socio-economic dimension 
of the conflict between the North and South Sudan since February 1972 to January 
2005. This study proposes a number of recommendations in terms of the peace 
process in the Sudan with possible wider application to other future peace 
agreements.  
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 RESEARCH THEME 
 
Conflict is arguably the concept that has enjoyed the most attention in world politics 
today. The specific focus within the analysis of conflict has shifted as new issues have 
increased in prominence. One of the issues that have come to the forefront of conflict 
analysis is the socio-economic dimension of conflicts. 
 
The socio-economic dimension of conflicts has enjoyed increasing attention in research 
dealing with the dynamics of contemporary conflict. The increasing extent to which 
socio-economic considerations have been perceived as a motivation for continuation of 
conflict has served to shift the spotlight of analysis from the political to the socio-
economic dimension. More specifically, the role of identity and natural resources in the 
economic dimension of conflict has also become a topic of interest for scholars interested 
in conflict dynamics. The nexus between natural, economics and conflict has played a 
defining role in a number of Africa’s most intractable conflicts (Taiser & Matthews, 
2004:282). 
 
Recently, the challenge facing the Sudanese Government is to develop an economy that 
had been sadly neglected by colonial authorities and northern elites alike and which had 
suffered from the destructive impact of a lengthy civil war. With the promise of central 
government funding and control over revenue from resources and development, there was 
some hope that the prior neglect of the south would end and the North-South socio-
economic gap might even narrow (Taiser & Matthews, 2004:282).  
 
However, clashes along the north-south border have continued and killed hundreds of 
people in the past year despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the 
north (Khartoum Government) and the south (Sudan People’s Liberation Army), which 
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was signed in January 2005. The agreement provided for power sharing, the distribution 
of oil earnings, and a referendum on national unity (ICG, 2006). The attempts to resolve 
this conflict have remained ad hoc, sporadic and lacking in coordination, and in this 
fragmentation is the critical challenge to resolving the problem Therefore, the purpose of 
this research is to find out if the work that has been carried out in the peace process 
includes the socio-economic factors.  
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM, AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Conflict in Sudan has a very long history (Furley & May, 2006:167). Throughout its 
independent history, Sudan has been characterized by multiple levels of conflict: tensions 
between the mostly Arab and Islamic northern part of the country and the non-Arab and 
non-Muslim southern part of the country (Boulden, 2003:185 and Furley, 1995:92). Since 
its onset in 1955 the Sudan civil war has, for most of its history, been a low priority on 
the agenda of the international community, and the United Nations (UN) in particular 
(Petterson, 2003:7). The genesis of the conflict was a failure by the Sudanese 
Government to honor an agreement that provided for a federal system of administration. 
The most obvious of these processes had been the spread of Islam and Arab identities in 
the north and years of British imperial rule from 1898 to 1956, which encouraged the 
spread of Christianity and African identity in the south. Yet behind these obvious points 
of differentiation between north and south there were also processes of economic 
imbalance as the north took ever-greater control of Sudan’s resources, in conjunction 
with the international penetration of the country’s economy, while the south lagged 
behind feeling first neglected and then increasingly exploited. Successive governments 
have done extremely little to ease the grievances of the south. The North-South Sudan 
civil wars are said to have cost the lives of 1.5 million people. Recently however, the 
momentum for a peace process in Sudan has increased. This is explained by an increasing 
realization on the part of the international community that the conflict is more than a 
domestic affair. Despite the signing of peace agreements, the attempts to resolve this 
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conflict have remained ad hoc, sporadic and lacking in coordination, and dealing with 
this fragmentation is critical if the problem is to be resolved (BBCNEWS, 2008).   
 
While the role of the socio-economic dimension in conflicts has been explored and 
conceptual frameworks developed, little research had been devoted to the socio-economic 
dimensions of conflict resolution. The aim of this study is to redress this gap between 
conflict analysis and peace agreements. The underlying assumption of this study is that 
the socio-economic dimension of conflict can be hugely informative in terms of an 
understanding as to why peace agreements fail and enable us to draw insights that will be 
of value to other experiments in building a lasting peace. It is believed that the objective 
of the study can be achieved by exploring the ways in which theory has dealt with the 
conflict-economics nexus, analyzing the extent to which theory accounts for the conflict 
reality in Sudan. The study will also subsequently propose a number of recommendations 
in terms of peace building in Sudan.  
 
More specifically, this study will address a number of key research questions, including:  
• In what respect can we view contemporary conflict theories as a response to the 
changing conflict context and a departure from previous conflict theories?  
• Does an analysis of the socio-economic dimension of the conflict in Sudan 
support the findings of contemporary conflict theories? If so, should the socio-
economic dimension of the conflict in Sudan be taken into consideration during 
the formulation of peace agreements?  
 
The study will thus evaluate the extent to which the economic dimension of conflict has 
been taken into account in peace agreements in Sudan and justify why it is considered to 
be important to include the socio-economic dimension. Building on the analysis of the 
above questions, it is the objective of this study to make practical and, to a lesser extent, 
theoretical recommendations for conflict resolution initiatives. It is hypothesized that an 
analysis of the socio-economic dimension of conflict will illuminate the extent to which 
the socio-economic agendas of belligerents represent obstacles to the resolution conflict.  
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The objective of this study is not to provide a definite and universally conclusive answer 
to whether belligerents are primarily motivated by political or socio-economic 
considerations, but rather to clarify the presence of an influential socio-economic 
dimension in this conflict and to argue for its inclusion in peace agreements. As far as the 
temporal dimension is concerned, the study will be limited to the period between 27 
February 1972 and 7 January 2005. In short, this study will introduce a number of 
frameworks for interpreting conflict and emphasize major areas of theoretical interest and 
contention, with particular focus on the socio-economic dimension.  
 
The main variables in this study would be aspects such as socio-economic issues and 
conflict events so that one could establish a dependent relationship of one to the other. It 
is believed that the poor and unjust socio-economic conditions are breeding grounds for 
political and social destabilization with ensuing disorder and violent conflicts (Sorbo & 
Vale, 1997:23). Sudan's economy is booming on the back of increases in oil production, 
high oil prices, and large inflows of foreign direct investment. GDP growth registered 
more than 10% per year in 2006 and 2007. From 1997 to date, Sudan has been working 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement macroeconomic reforms, 
including a managed float of the exchange rate. Sudan began exporting crude oil in the 
last quarter of 1999. Agricultural production remains important, because it employs 80% 
of the work force and contributes a third of GDP (ICG, 2006). This study will tend to 
focus on the socio-economic issues between Northern and Southern Sudan and their 
conflict outcomes of it. 
 
 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although conflict is endemic in society, it is not easy to define. Yet, it is not possible to 
understand, analyse, or even manage conflict before defining its nature and content 
(Mwagiru, 2006:1). Jeong (1999:3) described conflict as a contentious process of 
interpersonal or inter-group interaction that takes place within a larger social context. 
This means that conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about 
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something. For instance, the conflict in North-South Sudan is about different sets of 
incompatible goals. One of these is the difference in perception between the north and 
south about their role in Sudanese society. As sources of grievances are often associated 
with structural injustice, the most serious conflict encompasses various types of social 
problems reflected in inter-group relations. Thus inter-group conflict is often imbedded in 
a political framework, and its meaning can be socially interpreted and constructed. 
 
Conflict entails material bases of social life, as well as psychological. While changes in 
enemy perceptions are necessary for collaborative problem solving, building a new 
relationship would have to go beyond removing misperceptions of adversaries (Korzenny 
& Toomey, 1990:56). Conflict resolution is ingrained in the analysis of inter-group 
dynamics, as well as the process and outcome of negotiating different values and 
incompatible interests (Mwaura & Schmeidi, 2002:43). The resolution of violent conflicts 
is usually considered a politically desirable objective (Vayrynen, 1991:1 and 
Wallensteen, 2007:7). It saves human lives, prevents the internal disorganization of 
nations and restores stability in their external relations (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2005:63).  
 
According to Mitchell (1981), all conflicts present a three-dimensional character of inter-
connected components, which transcend the common understanding of the concept of 
‘conflict’ as mere violent behaviour between two or more parties. The triadic conflict 
structure argues that “efforts to analyse disputes must take account of the existence of 
[the following] three components:  A conflict situation, conflict behaviour, and conflict 
attitudes and perceptions” (Mitchell, 1981:16-17). In this approach, conflicts erupt from a 
situation of perceived goal incompatibility between two or more parties in a given 
society. Put differently, when parties consciously desire and pursue goals that are 
mutually incompatible and therefore can only be achieved at the expenses of one another, 
we are in the presence of a conflict situation.  Goal incompatibility itself results from the 
“mismatch between social values and social structures” (Mitchell, 1981:18), whereby 
certain goods are deemed more desirable than others by the value system, thus creating a 
situation of scarcity and competition over their appropriation. Mitchell (1981:22-23) goes 
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on to distinguish positive or assertive goals (desiring a specific outcome or objective) 
from negative goals (the avoidance of undesirable future states or outcomes). According 
to him, conflicts involving negative goals from all the sides offer more alternative future 
states that could be mutually accepted as compromises by all the parties.  
 
The second important component in Mitchell’s typology is ‘conflict attitudes’ or “those 
psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both 
conflict situations and resultant conflict behaviours” (Mitchell, 1981:25). He adopts an 
instrumental approach to the question of the role of psychological considerations in 
conflict. In his view, psychological factors do not constitute the prime cause of conflicts 
as claimed by some scholars; instead, they are only emotional orientations and 
perceptions that result from one’s involvement in a conflict situation. However, they may 
exacerbate the conflict situation.  
 
Similarly, conflict behaviour also results from the initial situation of conflict (goal 
incompatibility). Parties will therefore attempt to pursue their own agenda, while trying 
to make their adversaries abandon or modify their goals, through various actions (in the 
broader sense, including actions on oneself or inaction, as long as it is aimed at 
influencing the behaviour of the other parties).  
 
Cobbold and Mills (2004:23) and Imobighe (2003:07), based on the theory of conflict 
management, broadly point out that the management of conflict is concerned with the 
ways and means of controlling and harmonising conflictual relationships within an 
interaction process. Imobighe (2003:07) further adds that in inter-state relations conflict 
management should be concerned with the ways “in which events especially the stresses 
and strains in the relations between nations are controlled to ensure some harmony 
between parties concerned. If the conflictual relationship in human interaction is to be 
effectively controlled, it must be tackled at the roots.” This means that efforts toward 
conflict management must seek to eliminate the conditions that create an environment of 
conflict. In other words, one should not wait for latent conflict to become manifest. 
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Another important factor in conflict management is human needs satisfaction which, as 
argued by Burton (1990:36), “is the technique’s leading exponent that human beings have 
certain needs that are human and malleable and that must be satisfied if there is to be 
development and conforming behaviour.” As Zartman (1995:77) points out, “any policy 
that neglects human needs thus cannot but generate protest behaviour and conflict.” Like 
the theory of appeasement, human needs theory seeks to get at the root of conflict, and to 
explore and respond to the reasons for protest and deviant behaviour that tend to generate 
conflict. Furley (1995:02) lists some of the human needs that can lead, and in most 
conflict situations have led, to the outbreak of conflict which is “the unsatisfactory nature 
of inter-state borders, ethnic differences, catastrophic economic performance and unequal 
distribution of natural resources, lastly secessionism.” These are but a few as there are 
some other factors that can lead to a conflict outbreak. However, in the case of the 
Sudanese it is largely socio-economic factors that have contributed to decades of conflict, 
such as unequal distribution of natural resources, maladministration by government, and 
poor living conditions in the south compared to the north of Sudan. As Elnur (2009:17) 
points out, a combination of the above-mentioned factors has led to the conflict being one 
of the most complex conflicts of the 21st
 
 century. Adar, Nyuot Yoh and Maloka 
(2004:17) summarise the importance of the satisfaction of human needs by arguing that 
“conflict is generally a response to frustrated needs, hence to resolve a conflict (as in the 
case of Sudan) one must first seek to identify the frustrated needs to be satisfied and then 
work out the various options available for their satisfaction so as to arrive at some 
mutuality of interests between the parties, which they can explore to resolve the conflict.” 
Moreover, the proper response to early warning signs of conflict is to take preventive 
measures. This is an aspect of preventive diplomacy which tries to address conflicts 
before they erupt, and before they become dysfunctional. As the civil war in Sudan has 
been ranging intermittently for four decades, preventive diplomacy can only be relevant 
if it is understood in a broad sense, as involving initiatives to end the war and prevent 
further destruction and its humanitarian tragedies (Deng, 1997:1). 
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To talk of problem solving without addressing the source of the problem is meaningless. 
Therefore, problem solving at the level of intra-state and inter-state relations must also 
seek to alter the conditions that breed friction and unrest in societal relations.  In the case 
of Sudan, Meckenkamp, Tongeren and Van de Veen (1999:167) argue that since the 
north attained a higher level of economic development in colonial times and is home to 
about three-quarters of the country’s population, the south feels itself to be marginalized 
and the victim of discrimination. The study will explore the source of conflict situations 
of what happened before, what is happening now and what will happen in the future. A 
conflict management system will therefore be designed to address the underlying issues 
and provide security to the people to avoid further future conflict in terms of identity and 
resources, such as oil and land, between North and South Sudan.  
 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study will be a review and analysis of documents collected or carried by the 
government or non-governmental organizations during a peace process between North 
and South Sudan. The aim of this study is to make a contribution by using qualitative 
data obtained from primary as well as secondary sources in the form of already published 
research. The study of the socio-economic dimension of conflict and the particular role of 
identity and especially the natural resources (such as oil and land) has led to the initiation 
of several peace agreements in an attempt to resolve deep rooted conflict between the two 
regions. This subject has been approached methodologically in a number of different 
ways with each method of analysis contributing to the understanding of different nuances 
of the subject (Silva & Samarasinghe, 1993:60).  This study only focuses on the 
qualitative aspect of the North-South Sudan conflict.  
 
The research for the study is based primarily on archival documents, official government 
publications, books, internet sources and newspaper reports, with limited reference to 
journal articles. Researching a contemporary topic usually limits the availability of 
suitable source material, especially archival material.  
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Another source of information which was extensively utilised is the collection of notes 
and documents of the United Nations and the World Bank, held by the United Nations 
Library in Pretoria. Therefore, the contents of this treatise are largely based on 
documentary evidence. 1
 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to make a contribution by 
using qualitative data obtained from primary as well as secondary sources in the form of 
already published research. 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE 
 
Chapter One – Introduction and the Research Overview 
This chapter introduces the research topic under investigation and highlight the sectional 
order of the entire research project. The research theme, research problem (aims and 
objective), literature survey, and the research methodology are critically discussed.   
 
Chapter Two – Theoretical Foundation 
The question underlying Chapter Two is: In what respect can we view contemporary 
conflict theories as a response to the changing conflict context and a departure from 
previous conflict theories? The discussion will provide a broad overview of the evolution 
of thinking concerning conflict with the objective of identifying ‘generations’ of scholars 
and shifts in ideas. The first sections will deal with seminal theories and concepts since 
they form the foundation of more contemporary approaches. The subsequent discussion 
will examine a number of more contemporary theories pertaining to the causes of 
conflict. The chapter will also grapple with the theoretical responses to the socio-
economy conflict nexus. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to contextualize the theories 
concerning the socio-economic causes of conflict.    
 
 
                                                 
1 This study will not employ a quantitative method of analysis since the plethora of statistical information 
and analyses based on quantitative methods would make such an exercise somewhat redundant. Field-
research has also been ruled out as an option for gathering information. 
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Chapter Three – Conflict Background 
This chapter will serve as the foundation for the discussion in Chapter Four by providing 
an overview of the geographical and historical context in which the conflict in Sudan is 
rooted.  
 
Chapter Four – The Socio-economic Dimension of Conflict 
Chapter Four aims to address two research questions. Firstly, does an analysis of the 
socio-economic dimension of the conflict in Sudan support the findings of contemporary 
conflict theories?  
 
If it is established that many of the conflict dynamics postulated in theory do apply to the 
conflict reality in Sudan, the next step will be to address the second research question: 
Should the socio-economic dimension of the conflict in Sudan be taken into consideration 
in terms of the formulation of peace agreements? 
 
Chapter Five – Peace Agreements and the Socio-economic Dimension 
Chapter Five addresses the following research question: Does a lack of attention to the 
socio-economic element in peace agreements represent an obstacle in building a lasting 
peace in Sudan? If so, should the socio-economic dimension of the conflict in Sudan be 
taken into consideration during the formulation of peace agreements such as the CPA? 
   
 
Chapter Six – Conclusion 
This chapter aims to make recommendations concerning more effective strategies for 
conflict resolution in Sudan. Additional issues to be addressed and actors to be involved 
in the peace process might be included in the recommendations. Recommendations will 
be made on manners of incorporating insights on the protracted nature of conflicts into 
the larger body of knowledge dealing with conflict analysis and conflict resolution.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict is a natural phenomenon that is associated with all living species in the world. 
However, conflict associated with mankind is different from the type of conflict that is 
experienced by other types of living species. Conflict associated with mankind is 
different in the sense that a human being’s development or evolvement comes with 
inventions in technological developments. Technological improvements have brought 
with them more devastating forms of conflict, with World War I and World War II being 
among the most devastating conflicts mankind has ever experienced. In order to 
comprehend the rationale behind the study of conflict, a theoretical background, making 
use of some of the most prominent scholars in the field will be presented. Some questions 
that can be asked of the rationalisation of contemporary conflict are: 
•  In what respect can we view conflict theories as a response to the changing 
conflict context and a departure from previous conflict theories?  
• What are the underlying factors of conflict, in this case the North-South Sudanese 
conflict?  
 
These theoretical questions will help in contextualizing the North-South Sudan conflict 
that has endured for decades with no prospect of reaching its conclusion. The main 
theoretical framework that will be used in the comprehension of this conflict will include 
Mitchell’s (1981) triadic structure of conflict which will address conflict attitudes, 
conflict behaviours and conflict situation. Secondly, the biological nature of conflict will 
be examined which in this case influences human perspectives or approaches in conflict. 
Thirdly, social dimensions of conflict will be examined from the perspective of religion 
and race relations. Economic benefits and natural resources have transformed the nature 
 12 
of conflict in the 21st
 
 century, with many conflicts being ignited by the scramble for 
natural resources and the huge economic benefits that would be derived from them. 
2.1.1 Triadic Conflict Structure 
According to Mitchell (1981), all conflicts present a three-dimensional character of inter-
connected components, which transcend the common understanding of the concept of 
‘conflict’ as mere violent behaviour between two or more parties. The triadic conflict 
structure argues that “efforts to analyse disputes must take account of the existence of 
[the following] three components:  A conflict situation, conflict behaviour, and conflict 
attitudes and perceptions” (Mitchell, 1981:16-17). In this approach, conflicts erupt from a 
situation of perceived goal incompatibility between two or more parties in a given 
society. Put differently, when parties consciously desire and pursue goals that are 
mutually incompatible and therefore can only be achieved at the expenses of one another, 
we are in presence of a conflict situation.   
 
Mitchell’s Triadic Conflict Structure 
 
 
Source: Mitchell, 1985 
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Goal incompatibility itself results from the “mismatch between social values and social 
structures” (Mitchell, 1981:18), whereby certain goods are deemed more desirable than 
others by the value system, thus creating a situation of scarcity and competition over their 
appropriation. Mitchell (1981:22-23) goes on to distinguish positive or assertive goals 
(desiring a specific outcome or objective) from negative goals (the avoidance of 
undesirable future states or outcomes). According to him, conflicts involving negative 
goals from all sides offer more alternative future states that could be mutually accepted as 
compromises by all the parties.  
 
The second important component in Mitchell’s typology is ‘conflict attitudes’ or “those 
psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both 
conflict situations and resultant conflict behaviours” (Mitchell, 1981:25). He adopts an 
instrumental approach to the question of the role of psychological considerations in 
conflict. In his view, psychological factors do not constitute the prime cause of conflicts 
as claimed by some scholars; instead, they are only emotional orientations and 
perceptions that result from one’s involvement in a conflict situation. However, they may 
cause the exacerbation of the conflict situation and its later escalation.  
 
Similarly, conflict behaviour also results from the initial situation of conflict (goal 
incompatibility). Parties will therefore attempt to pursue their own agenda, while trying 
to make their adversaries abandon or modify their goals, through various actions (in the 
broader sense, including actions on oneself or inaction, as long as it is aimed at 
influencing the behaviour of the other parties).  
 
This simplified definition of Mitchell’s triadic conflict merely points out the main 
elements of the theory. How do they apply to the practical example of the North-South 
Sudan conflict? The practicality of Mitchell’s (1981) triadic conflict will be applied in 
Chapter Four of the socio-economic dimension in the North-South Sudan conflict which 
contains a detailed analysis of the conflict in Sudan, while Chapter Three will provide the 
historical background of the conflict.  
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2.2 THE NATURE OF CONFLICT 
 
2.2.1 Biological Nature of Conflict 
Conflict, as pointed out earlier, is rooted in human nature. It is a biological phenomenon 
that comes with humans expressing their unhappiness, and settling and resolving 
differences, amongst many other reasons that lead human beings into conflict situations. 
Biological explanations of conflict have their roots in Darwinism, and they essentially 
champion the inherency view of conflict. Social Darwinism was based on the notion of 
natural selection being in favour of the more aggressive, who will therefore gain more 
material resources. Socio-biology, which is another branch of biological theories of 
conflict, is concerned with the genetic sources of behaviour (Mwagiru, 2006:18). 
 
2.2.2 Inherent Nature of Conflict 
Inherency and contingency theories are the conceptual backbone of biological theories. 
The inherency view of conflict argues that conflict is a normal and natural thing in 
society. In the contingency view, people get into conflict situations not because of the 
inherent factor, but because of the circumstances they find themselves in. In this view, it 
is not inevitable that they will get into conflict. Indeed, conflict may be avoided by better 
information, less misconceptions and more rational behaviour (Mwagiru, 2006:17). 
 
The inherency and contingency debate has been a part of the discourse about power and 
its use in society for a long time. The debate between inherency and contingency is very 
relevant for conflict analysts. That debate gives rise to two perspectives that are germane 
to understanding conflict and its management. The first is that if those in power adopt an 
inherency view of human nature, then social control becomes an important aspect of the 
exercise of power. Since in their view human desires cannot be satisfied, any concession 
is seen as a step towards anarchy. The second perspective is that if those in power take 
the contingency view, they try to avoid disruptions in society by trying to meet the 
demands of the people through negotiation and accommodation (Mwagiru, 2006:18). 
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2.2.3 Psychological Nature of Conflict 
Two main psychological theories about conflict are the “frustration-aggression theory” 
and the theory of relative deprivation. These two theories are necessary, though not 
sufficient, conditions for the explanation of social conflict. The frustration-aggression 
theory has two major propositions: that all aggression is the result of frustration, and that 
all frustration will lead to aggression (Mitchell, 1981:71). The argument here is that while 
aggression is not innate in human beings, the potential for aggression is activated by 
certain kinds and levels of frustration. 
 
The classical statement of the frustration-aggression theory was modified later when it 
was demonstrated that there are other causes of aggression apart from frustration. It has 
also been shown that whether or not frustration leads to aggression depends on other 
things, for instance the importance attached to the goal being frustrated (Mitchell, 
1981:71). 
  
   
2.3  SOCIAL CONFLICT 
 
Social conflict has been defined in various ways. All human beings are affected by social 
conflict as it is inherent in human relations. But this does not mean that every social 
relationship is entirely or even partly conflicting all the time. Nor does it mean that every 
underlying conflicting relationship will be expressed with the same degree and kind of 
hostility or violence. Conflicts vary in their bases, their duration, and their mode of 
settlement, their outcomes, and their consequences. For the purpose of this chapter, social 
conflict will provisionally be taken to mean a struggle over values and claims to power, 
prestige and scarce resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure 
or eliminate their rivals (Mwagiru, 2006:6).     
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2.3.1 A Typology of Social Conflicts 
People are aggressive, conflicting creatures. After World War II the study of conflict 
burgeoned dramatically. As revealed by the mass media, social conflict in all its varied 
manifestations is a leading topic of general interest and attention (Mwagiru, 2006:5). 
 
Accordingly to Gurr (1972:27), the study of social conflict has been classified into 
several categories. First, the category of private conflict includes struggles between 
collective actors in which the state or the government is not a primary party to the action. 
This category also includes that wide range of interreligious, interracial, interethnic and 
interclass struggles that characterize most modern societies. In developing societies 
private conflict would include interclan and intertribal strife. All modern industrial 
societies know labour management conflict and various intrasocietal struggles, such as 
interregional and rural-urban clashes. It has been stated that private conflicts do not 
involve the state or government as a major participant. Sometimes, however, conflicts 
which are private in one situation may result in international war in another, for example 
interreligious conflicts (Mwagiru, 2006:14). Thus, in the United States religious struggles 
are private matters, but in the Middle East or on the Asian subcontinent contending 
nationality groups also present different religions. Governments also often enter private 
conflicts as rule-enforcer or peacemaker. Private conflicts tend to vary in the degree of 
organization. Often, though not always, they are well organized and well-led. Their 
tactics also vary widely. Sometimes such conflicts are restrained and waged by peaceful 
methods. At other times, however, they erupt into intense violent struggles. 
 
The second category is civil strife, meaning conflicts that involve units and agents of 
government in some way. Although one collective actor is a private group or 
organization, the other represents a government and hence is distinct from private 
conflict. Gurr (1968:22) identifies three subtypes of civil strife: turmoil, conspiracy, and 
internal war. Under the heading turmoil, Gurr lists such activities as political 
demonstrations and movements against the government. In this category he also places 
disturbances and riots, as well as strikes injurious to the public interest. Thus Gurr would 
categorize turmoil as a rancorous citizens’ group at city council that interrupted or 
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prevented the meeting, which could also include a rock-throwing, window-breaking clash 
with police on a downtown street. Strikes by public school teachers, police, firefighters, 
railway engineers, and hospital employees are other illustrations. A further instance of 
turmoil is clashes with the police resulting from confrontations with street crowds. Often 
such active conflicts are public expressions of social movements, which view them as 
tactics in the struggle for “legitimate” rights or ends. Whatever their specific purpose or 
official role may be, people are involved as “citizens”, and so are oriented toward the 
political organization of the community or society. Although some manifestations of 
turmoil, for example strikes or social movements, are well organized and led, others are 
spontaneous and poorly organized. Because of its very nature, turmoil invites popular 
participation. It is expressed through a wide range of tactics, although often these consist 
of spontaneous improvisations (Gurr, 1972:28).  
 
Gurr (1968:24) uses the term conspiracy to refer to limited and secretive plans and 
actions against a government or its leaders. In these respects it differs from turmoil. 
Assassinations of government officials, as well as plots and plans for assassinations are 
classified as conspiracies. Sometimes these actions are accompanied by small-scale 
terrorism and guerrilla actions. It has been stated that conspiracies is that kind of civil 
strife involving secret attacks against the government and/or its leaders. They tend to be 
well organized and tightly controlled, since secrecy is essential to their success. 
Leadership may be good and participants both limited in number and carefully chosen; 
the theory of conspiracy is built on the notion that too many cooks spoil the broth. Actors 
in conspiracies tend to use many kinds of tactics, usually chosen rationally for their 
instrumental value. By the very nature of the organization and action, violence and 
violence-producing tactics are common and often favourite tools of conspirators. 
 
In addition, internal war refers to an organized action of a large sector of a political 
society in rebellion against and/or withdrawal from national state. Sometimes internal 
wars become international when other nations intervene on one side or the other. Internal 
war differs significantly from turmoil and conspiracy. Of the three subtypes of civil strife, 
this is perhaps the most inclusive. Terms like insurrection, rebellion, civil war, revolt and 
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revolution refer to various forms of internal war actions. All, however, refer to an 
organized armed attack against an independent state with the aim of political withdrawal 
or alteration of the governmental structure (Coser, 1957:197).       
 
Thirdly, social control refers to the actions of governments to resist or counter the 
conflicts of the collective actors discussed in the aforementioned sections. In many 
instances governments will be struggling to defend themselves from attacks by hostile 
groups or organizations. In the case of private conflict, governments will be entering the 
struggles to enforce the law and re-establish peace. In every case the official authority of 
the state or some other quasi-official bureaucracy will be engaged in the process of social 
conflict (Gurr, 1972:45). 
 
Fourthly, the ultimate form of social conflict is international war. Since war has always 
been among the most disturbing, dramatic and exciting events in human experience, it 
has attracted great attention in all ages. War is an act or state of military conflict between 
political units, for example, nation-states or tribes. The most dramatic recent expressions 
have been the First and Second World Wars and then the Cold War. War may be 
“declared” or “undeclared.” That is, one nation may announce formally and publicly that 
it intends to attack another with military forces, or such an announcement may be 
withheld. In some cases only professional soldiers are involved, in others entire civilian 
populations are also drawn into military contests. Of late, since the people of the world 
have been seriously concerned with avoiding, preventing or terminating wars, there has 
been concern about “aggressive” and “defensive” wars. International morality holds that 
a war of attack, presumably unjustified or poorly justified, is aggressive and thus to some 
degree reprehensible. On the other hand, the war that defends against such an attack is 
called defensive and is presumed to enjoy some measure of moral legitimacy. Since wars 
are destructive conflicts between whole political organizations, they can exert great 
influence upon societies (Gurr, 1968:20).  
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2.3.2 Social structure in Social Conflict 
Mitchell (1981:20) suggested that the genesis of conflict is to be found in aspects and 
changes of social structure. The ordinary arrangements of civilian life or day-to-day 
activities may function to generate collective struggles, but in order to actively engage in 
struggles new and different modes of organization are needed.  
 
Social conflict refers to a struggle between collective actors. Whatever the general social 
setting – international war, street riot, labour strike, or legal contest – the structure of 
conflict is basically the same. It is composed of two or more actors, facing each other and 
positioned in such a way as to invite struggle. Referring to the dynamic component of this 
arrangement, Dahrendorf (1958:176) declared that the conflict structure is the “tendency 
of interests to oppose each other”. In this struggle of actors and opposition of interests, 
the participants play two roles, namely attacker and defender. One actor attacks the other 
because the other is known or believed to obstruct the achievement of desired scarce 
values. The actor under attack is likely to defend himself, to return the fight. Thus, as 
Williams (1972:18) has suggested, from the outset and by the very nature of conflict, the 
actors play both the roles of attacker and of defender simultaneously. These two roles, 
positioned to ensure confrontation and bound together by an interactive process of 
struggle, constitute the key components of the conflict structure whose working parts 
include: two social roles, each of which may include one or more collective actors; two 
social positions that place the roles in the posture of confrontation; a set of scarce values 
that are the goals of struggle, and ancillary values that condition the conflict in various 
ways; a set of norms that embody the social values and pattern and systematize the 
conflict relationship; and a relationship characterized by a series of struggles between the 
actors that is more or less patterned by traditional and emergent norms. 
 
The fact of a basic conflict structure has been recognized by most students of social 
conflict. Marx saw major conflict as emanating from the inevitable revolutionary struggle 
of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. All sectors of the industrial society would feed 
into one or another of these inclusive camps confronting each other in the posture of 
escalating struggle. The existence of scarce values, or at least the assumption that certain 
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values are in scarce supply, is a working part of the conflict structure. Acquisition of 
scarce values is the ultimate goal of conflict. Removal of a competing or interfering 
collective actor is the immediate end of conflict. Without the existence of both a value 
goal and interfering opponent, social conflict is not possible. Social conflict is also 
qualified by a series of ancillary values. Conflict may be important to save face, enhance 
in-group solidarity, improve a public image or bolster self-respect. Even in realistic 
conflict, the struggle itself is sometimes also a value. Such ancillary values are built into 
the total conflict structure (Williams, 1972:19). 
 
Social conflict arises from the structured arrangement of individuals and groups in a 
social system from the very fact of social organization. In every social organization, as 
Dahrendorf (1959:165) has pointed out, some positions are entrusted with a right to 
exercise control over other positions and to ensure compliance with authority through 
coercion. In other words, there exists a division of authority in such a way that there are 
individuals and groups who are subject to authority rather than participants in its exercise. 
The persistence in time of authority structures gives rise to relations of dominance and 
subordination and thus provides the occasion for exploitation. At the same, social 
organization rests on social differentiation and the division of labour through which the 
satisfaction of individuals wants and the provisions of collective goods are pursued. The 
combination of the division of labour with super- and subordination makes up the basic 
configuration of social positions, strata, and classes in the social system. 
 
There is no once and for all solution to the problem of distributing scarce resources 
among the members of a society thus constituted. At any given moment, there exists a 
certain distribution of scarce resources and of rewards; the good things desired and 
sought after by most, such as wealth, power, and prestige among the individuals, groups, 
and classes in a society. Some are better off and others are worse off. Those who are 
favoured have a vested interest in conserving and consolidating their existing share, those 
who are negatively privileged seek to increase theirs, individually or collectively. Social 
conflict results from this clash of opposing interests (Dahrendorf, 1959:166).  
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Privileges, the good and desired things in life, and the social positions and relationships 
that assure their continued enjoyment are not given up without resistance. The very 
institutions that create the misery and suffering of some contribute to the freedom and 
security of others. Freedom, rights, and a greater share of material wealth is not handed to 
negatively privileged groups on a silver platter. They have to be gained at considerable 
risk, sacrifice, and expenditure of time and resources. Coser (1956:33), once remarked 
that society does not change its institutions as need arises the way a mechanic changes his 
instruments. The tenacity and determination of vested interests in resisting change makes 
social conflict a fundamental fact of existence (Coser, 1956:33).  
 
Nevertheless, not all communities and societies experience the same degree of conflict, 
nor does a single society experience the same degree of conflict over time. The forms that 
conflict assumes, for example non-violent and violent, institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized, vary in time and social space. The locus of conflict shifts from the 
courts and parliament into the streets and vice versa. The issues at stake change. The 
capacity of different institutional arrangements for conflict regulation varies. A theory of 
social conflict has to address itself to the complexity and variability of conflict. 
 
It is true that there have been and will be periods when negatively privileged groups 
appear to accept their collective fate passively and without complaint, though as 
individuals they strive to improve their lot. They may do so because they accept the 
existing system of stratification, authority and inequality as just and legitimate, or else 
because they are powerless in the face of superior might and fearful of the consequences 
of opposition. But the ubiquity of social change and the fact of unrealized ideals ensure 
that such a state of affairs is but transitory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986:4). 
 
Once the hallmark of Western European and North American society, social change has 
become a worldwide phenomenon in the twentieth century. Coser (1957:198) spoke of 
capitalism as a process of creative destruction; this is an appropriate characterization of 
the worldwide process of change as well. Population growth, migration, the growth of 
cities and of industry, changes in technology, modes of production, communication, 
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organization and the scale of society are everywhere, accompanied by changes in the 
everyday lives and security of ordinary people. Some groups advance while others stand 
still or decline. Some, threatened with the loss of their livelihood, cling tenaciously to 
traditional ways. Others, advancing and reaping unheard-of profits, seek to speed the 
processes of change and prepare to defend their gains against newer claimants (Coser, 
1957:198). Others find further progress blocked by still-powerful groups who are 
determined not to yield their inherited privileges. Existing institutions and social 
arrangements are no longer suited to solve new problems of an altogether different order 
and magnitude. New ideas that question sacred assumptions and time honoured ways of 
handling affairs are diffused. Reforms lag behind new needs. Eventually, the existing 
conflict increases in intensity and new social conflict erupts. Changes and conflict are 
intimately linked. It is the rising and declining groups and classes formed and 
transformed during periods of change that usually constitute the core of social 
movements and organized groups who seek to reform and revolutionise existing 
institutions or, on the contrary, defend social order under attack (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986:5). 
 
Social conflict is seldom a simple mechanical reaction to grievances and frustrations 
experienced in the pursuit and defence of material interests. Interest and dissatisfactions 
are experienced and interpreted by way of moral ideas about right and wrong, justice and 
injustice; conceptions of the social order as they are expressed in ideals and highly 
regarded principles (Coser, 1961:350). Human society incorporates fundamental 
dilemmas that cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactory to all groups once and for all. 
Both freedom and social justice are highly valued, yet the overemphasis on individual 
freedom and liberty have led to a waste of human and natural resources, to excessive 
inequality, to the over commercialization of social relationships, and to the abuse of 
power by large organized groups (Bercovitch, 1984:59).  
 
The pursuit of social justice to the complete disregard of freedom, on the other hand, can 
only lead to sterile uniformity, coerced conformity, and a decline of individual effort. 
New nations wish to become powerful and develop in an economic sense. At the same 
time they seek to diminish the inequality that is associated with past injustices. Yet these 
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two goals are likely to be incompatible, at least in the near future, and it is the short run 
that counts for most people (Mwagiru, 2006:24). 
 
To speed development, incentives and steep rewards are needed to encourage production 
and achievement. The consequence will be increased inequality among the citizenry. 
Those who seek to eradicate the inequality of rewards and instead rely on ideological and 
moral appeals may find themselves left in a community of equals and living in poverty, 
or else, disenchanted with the lack of dedication of masses, will be coerced into doing 
what is “best for them” within an authoritarian framework (Bercovitch, 1984:61). 
 
 
2.4 THEORIES OF CONFLICT 
 
Scholars searched in many places for primary explanations. Some believed they found 
the key in the individual’s heredity. These scholars fashioned the “instinct” theory of 
conflict. While agreeing that the source of conflict resided within the individual, other 
scholars formulated the causal force as “tensions” issuing from certain aspects of the 
social experience. Hegel, Marx, and their followers directed attention to the interactive 
process itself as the locale of the causal source of conflict. Some other scholars believed 
that its genesis lay within changes of the social structure. The structural explanation was 
formulated in various ways. In recent years there is increasing consensus among scholars 
that some expression of frustration may be the basic causal factor in the explanation of 
social conflict. The argument is that the frustration of every social system leads to 
discontent which, under certain circumstances, can solidify into social conflict (Himes, 
1980:27). 
 
Dahrendorf (1958:170), made use of a structural approach to formulate a significantly 
different kind of conflict theory. He asserted that the task of sociological analysis was to 
associate conflicts with specific conflict structures, and not to relegate explanation to 
psychological variables like aggressiveness or hostility, descriptive-historical factors like 
mass migrations, or mere chance. From this perspective the prelude to conflict lies in 
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structural situations in which conflict is potential. Dahrendorf argues that the analytic and 
explanatory tasks of sociology of conflict can be phrased in such questions as how 
conflicts groups arise from the structures of society, what forms struggle may take among 
such groups, and how conflict among such groups affects change of social structure 
(Himes, 1980:31). 
 
Dahrendorf (1958:175) went on to assert that initiating structure of conflict is composed 
of social categories of unequal rank and power and divergent interests between which 
there is an ongoing relationship of cooperation and conflict. The degree of potential for 
increased conflict implicit in this structural situation is conditioned by such factors as 
polarization of the categories by status and power disparity; diverse, immobilized and 
unfocused interests; and definitions of the categories as in and out groups.  
 
Internal and external forces impinge upon the structure, altering the ranks, power, 
functions, and relations among constituent categories in the direction of either expanded 
cooperation or increased conflict. The articulation of manifest interests, the organization 
of conflict groups, and the increase of conflict are facilitated by the intervention of 
certain variable technical, political, social, and psychological conditions. Dahrendorf 
concludes that once this complex process is complete, conflict groups have emerged and 
stand in a conflict potential relationship within an associational structure of the social 
system (Himes, 1980:32) 
 
2.4.1 Conflict Theories of Social Organization 
Some scholars have argued that social conflict is the major source of organization in 
society. That is, the pattern or form of organization in social systems issues from the 
influence of social struggle. However, although such theories agree regarding the source 
of social organization, they differ as to how conflict operates in the organizing process. In 
a remarkable discussion of the source of cohesion and integration in society, Dahrendorf 
(1958:178) identified the “two faces of society” which he called “integration and values” 
and “coercion and interests”. He concluded that the coercion model was basic, while the 
integration mechanism played a secondary and supportive role. The variable organization 
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of societies that emerges from this conflict is a latent function of collective struggles for 
various specific goals. He began by arguing that stability and organization in industrial 
societies was initially maintained by the control of the major bureaucratic centres of 
power, the “authoritative associations”. However, from the outset, the system included 
important sources of instability and potential change. The population was divided into 
two unorganized and opposing categories, “quasi-groups” that differed in rank and 
authority and that were distinguished by divergent “latent interests” (Himes, 1980:136). 
 
Mitchell (1981:22) argued that this unstable pattern of organization was the function of 
prior class conflict and that it would be altered by the renewal of that conflict. He 
identified certain “conditions” such as, “technical conditions, political conditions, and 
social conditions”, in the societal situation that he believed tended to lead to conflict and 
change. Initially, these factors generated conflict groups within the quasi-groups.  
 
Some individuals within the weak and subordinate category began to reveal traits of 
personality and character that presaged the emergence of organizational leadership. 
Within the unorganized category the political conditions of organization appeared when 
individuals coalesced into groups and when marginal power and novel ideas emerged. 
Improvements of communication established the social conditions of organization. 
Intensification of the sense of deprivation and a rising level of expectations, when 
combined with internalization of organizational roles, established the psychological basis 
of organization (Himes, 1980:136). 
 
In Dahrendorf’s (1958:179) view, these factors in combination led to several significant 
changes. Latent interests of the quasi-groups became manifest and were expressed as 
organizational goals. With leadership, motivation, and increasing power, specific 
organizations called conflict groups emerged within the quasi-groups, seeking the 
manifest interests through collective struggle. The “class conflict” that issued from this 
situation tended to produce changes in the initial social organization. A new pattern of 
quasi-groups, interests, status and power was produced, which in time became 
crystallized into a class system in an industrial society (Himes, 1980:137).   
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2.4.2 Departure into Conflict  
In his influential Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society, Dahrendorf 
(1958:180) presents his theory of “integration and values” on the one hand and “coercion 
and interest” on the other as the embodiments of “the two faces of society”. He argues 
that two schools of sociological thought, each claiming for itself the ability to account for 
the problem of how societies cohere, have historically stood in conflict. However, both 
the ‘utopian’ school, stressing value consensus, and the ‘rationalist’ school, stressing 
force, domination and constraints, “advance claims for the primacy of their respective 
standpoints” (Binns, 1977:78). 
 
Dahrendorf (1958:181) asserts that both models have equal explanatory validity for the 
solution of different sociological problems, but proceeds to argue that recent sociological 
thought has been excessively dominated by integration theory. In particular, he criticises 
Parsons for the essentially one sided nature of his ‘utopian’ analysis. Citing the East 
Berlin revolt of 1953 as evidence of an aspect of society inexplicable in terms of such 
theory, he similarly challenges the universal explanatory power of coercion theory. The 
two models, he suggests, constitute complementary rather than mutually exclusive 
aspects of social structure. The notion of a ‘Janus-headed’ society, in other words, is 
Dahrendorf’s methodological starting point.  
 
His principal concern in Class and Class Conflict is to explain the aetiology of organised 
social conflict “on the assumption of the coercive nature of social structure” (Dahrendorf, 
1959:5). Dahrendorf’s intention is to account for a particular set of problematic social 
phenomena in terms of the constraint as opposed to the utopian or consensus model. His 
main thesis is that the coincidence of economic and political conflict, as stressed by 
Marx, is inapplicable to ‘post-capitalist’ societies, but his case rests largely on a confused 
and confusing interpretation of Marx’s writings and, consequently, Marx must be initially 
rescued from Dahrendorf if the latter’s work is to be meaningfully evaluated 
(Dahrendorf, 1959:5). 
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Dahrendorf cites Marx as an exponent of the rationalist school of social theory. Marx 
assumed, he notes, “the ubiquity of change and conflict as well as domination and 
subjection”. But Dahrendorf completely misinterprets the essence of Marx’s work, giving 
primacy to his political sociology, an aspect which in the context of Marx’s work as a 
whole is predicated, though by no means in a mechanical way, upon his political 
economy. To examine Marx’s formal statements on the formation of economic classes in 
capitalist society without serious consideration of his theories of commodity production, 
surplus-value and exploitation is, in a fundamental sense, to miss the central point of his 
life’s work, but this is precisely what Dahrendorf does (Dahrendorf, 1959:5). 
 
Dahrendorf lists the factors which he sees to be of particular importance in Marx’s theory 
of class. He identifies the supposedly heuristic nature of the theory, its ‘basis 
characteristic’ of being an essentially two class model, and the source of classes in the 
ownership and non-ownership of the means of production (Binns, 1977:80). In addition, 
he notes the identification of economic and political power, the realisation of classes as 
such when and only when they are organised in political conflict and, finally, an image of 
society and social change in which systematic conflict is an ‘essential feature’ (Binns, 
1977:80). 
 
These factors, when examined, are primarily concerned with what may be termed the 
political sociology of Marx. While Dahrendorf correctly identifies Marx’s view that 
classes derive their existence from ownership or non-ownership of the means of 
production, he avoids any detailed analysis of Marx’s actual work on the production and 
market dynamics of capitalist society. A rare and formal reference in which Marx 
emphasised the free sale of labour power, the production of surplus value, and the 
development of mechanised factory production ‘along with private property and 
existence of social classes as fundamental to capitalist society’, does little to later or 
argument this absence of analysis. Neither does Dahrendorf’s quotation from Capital, the 
essence of which is the equally formal proposition that the specific economic form in 
which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the immediate producers determines the 
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relation of domination and subjection as it grows directly out, of and in turn determines, 
production (Dahrendorf, 1959:117). 
 
While adequately identifying Marx’s overall assumptions concerning exploitative 
systems of social production in general, this selective quotation indicates only the 
theoretical starting point for his analysis of capitalism as a concrete mode of production 
with concrete and unique structural features. Dahrendorf’s analysis at no point goes 
beyond this level of generality and abstraction. Dahrendorf sees Marx’s theory of class to 
be an essentially heuristic device. He ignores the fact that Marx also saw classes as 
historically bound, objective socioeconomic formations arising from the social relations 
of production in definite material circumstances. Thus capital, essentially a social 
relation, arises only where the owner of the means of production and the means of 
subsistence finds in the market a free worker who offers his labour power for sale 
(Dahrendorf, 1959:118). 
 
To view Marx’s theory of class as primarily heuristic is, in fact, quite consistent with 
Dahrendorf’s effective divorce of Marx’s political economy on the one hand and his 
analysis of class formations on the other. Both, for Marx, were intimately related 
theoretical explanations of actual patterns of social relations. Dahrendorf, by effectively 
severing them, reduces Marx’s notion of class to a speculative and unlocated sociological 
category upon which the other ‘features’ of his work, such as the convergence of political 
and economic power, appear mechanically predicted. His almost exclusive concern with 
Marx as a political sociologist thus serves to shatter the internal consistency of Marx’s 
theory. In addition, it diverts attention away from Marx’s analysis of commodity 
production in capitalist society, the starting point of capital and clear evidence of his 
concern to explain, in theoretical terms, actual as against purely conceptual social 
relations of production (Binns, 1997:81). 
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2.4.3 Class Revisited 
While offering a critique of Marx’s usage of class, Dahrendorf seeks to preserve and 
develop the concept as such. He defines class as a category for the analysis of conflict-
oriented formations with systematic roots in the structure of society. Whereas Marx 
located the foundations of class conflict in the social relations of production, 
Dahrendorf’s innovation is to view classes as aggregates of the incumbents of identical or 
similar positions within particular relations of authority (Binns, 1997:85).  
 
For Dahrendorf, the identification of authority roles and their distinctive characteristics 
constitutes “the basic task of conflict analysis”. His unit of theoretical analysis is the 
Weberian “imperatively co-ordinated association”, characterized by internal relations of 
legitimate authority, within which the dominant and subjected groups have different and 
opposing interests. Using a scheme incorporating ‘quasi-groups’, Dahrendorf constructs 
an elaborate model of the transition from ‘latent’ to ‘manifest’ interests which both 
augments and flows from the logic of his initial assumption concerning the primacy of 
legitimate relations of authority as a determinant of class interests and conflict. It is on 
this assumption that Dahrendorf’s analysis of the class dynamics of ‘industrial society’ 
must stand or fall (Dahrendorf, 1959:121). 
 
Giddens has recently challenged Dahrendorf‘s model in terms of both its claims to 
account for the social reality of class conflict and its internal consistency. Concerning the 
former, Giddens attacks both the dichotomous nature of Dahrendorf’s model and its 
tendency to shift attention away from the problem of ‘classlessness’. Giddens further 
points out that Dahrendorf’s model neither implies that there is not any necessary conflict 
of interest between dominant and subordinate conflicts groups, nor that special attention 
should be paid to the areas of state and industry. These weaknesses in Dahrendorf’s 
exposition share a common source in his initial attempt to substitute authority for 
property ownership as the key determinant of class structure, but they all raise substantive 
problems in the sociological method and, as such, should be considered independently 
(Kriesberg, 1973:106). 
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Kriesberg (1973:107) initially questions Dahrendorf’s assumption that authority relations 
necessarily possess a dichotomous character. He seeks to correct what he perceives to be 
the theoretical crudity of Dahrendorf’s inflexible polarity of possession and non-
possession of authority by postulating “a graded hierarchy of relationships”. Now while 
this criticism is essentially correct, it should be pointed out that Dahrendorf does 
empirically recognise the widespread delegation of authority in many associations, 
including the state. His comments remain at an empirical level, however, and leave his 
basically dichotomous model unaltered. What delegation may take place occurs, for 
Dahrendorf, within and subordinate to the essentially two class paradigm (Kriesberg, 
1973:107). 
 
Furthermore, Dahrendorf’s analysis in and of itself in no way implies the necessity of 
conflict over the question of authority which he posits. Whereas for Marx the opposition 
of interest between classes derives from the generation and appropriation of surplus 
values, Dahrendorf’s theory allows the sociological possibility of permanent, voluntary 
and consensual cooperation around a set of enduring shared purposes. His model of 
society as conflictual and his image of class as an aspect of an authority relationship are, 
in other words, mechanically paired and have no organic or intrinsic connection outside 
their strictly conceptual association (Binns, 1977:86). 
 
 
2.4.4 Power 
A key problematic in Dahrendorf’s (Binns, 1977:88) theory is thus his treatment of the 
phenomena of power. His own view is that scientific research is characterised by what he 
terms “problem consciousness”: “at the outset of every scientific investigation there has 
to be a fact or set of facts that is puzzling the investigators”. At no point, however, does 
Dahrendorf systematically approach power as a problem to be examined by scientific 
methods. Throughout his work he repeatedly refers to the divergent interests to be found 
in contemporary societies (Binns, 1977:89).  
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The notion of a “plurality of interests in society and their contradictory character” is, 
then, a recurrent theme in Dahrendorf’s work (Kriesberg, 1973:109). A different element 
of finality and sociological absolutism is introduced, however, when he posits an 
inequality in social life. In On the origin of Inequality among Men he argues that the 
inevitable operation of norms and social expectations implies that there must always be at 
least that inequality of rank which results from the necessity of sanctioning behaviour 
according to whether it does or does not conform to established norms. Social norms and 
sanctions are thus the basis not only of ‘ephemeral individual rankings’ but also of 
‘lasting structures of social positions’(Kriesberg, 1973:110).This, in its bare outlines, 
constitutes Dahrendorf’s explanation of the empirically correct observation that even in 
the most affluent society it remains a stubborn and remarkable fact that men are 
unequally placed (Kriesberg, 1973:110). 
 
The enduring nature of the particular inequalities of capitalist societies is inexplicable in 
terms of this theory. In the first place, Dahrendorf’s account of normative sanctioning is 
incorrect: it is in fact behaviour that is subject to sanctions, although all human behaviour 
takes place within and is mediated by a system of more or less visibly coercive social 
relation which finds its expression in ‘positions’. Dahrendorf’s view that norms 
constitute, in the last analysis, the basis of ranking emerges when it is remembered that 
he attacks Parsons for offering an almost identical explanation. Even within his own 
assumptions, there is a profound and unresolved inconsistency concerning the 
relationship between norms and social ranking (Dahrendorf, 1959:157). 
 
The fundamental weakness of Dahrendorf’s stratification theory becomes apparent when 
he identifies power and its social consequences as the primary obstacle to the realization 
of the ‘pure’ market model of society. Nowhere, however, does he attempt to explicate in 
theoretical terms the source of power itself. Power is defined as the ability, by virtue of 
social roles, to make and enforce norms influencing the life chances of others. 
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2.4.5 Theory and Research in Conflict Prediction 
Scientific approaches to conflict prediction reveal a controlled interplay between theory 
and research. Employing available conflict theories, some social scientists investigate the 
possibilities of predicting conflict as the outcome of ongoing processes of change. Other 
scholars utilize the findings of such empirical studies to build conflict-prediction theories 
(Himes, 1980:149). 
 
Studies in the field of conflict prediction tend to focus on two main issues, the initiation 
and the termination of conflict. Since conflict is continuous, initiation refers in reality to 
the escalation of legitimate struggles into non-legitimate levels or forms. For example, 
the eruption of a riot or the outbreak of a war represents the transformation of previous 
struggles into non-legitimate forms (Henderson, 1971:85).  
 
However, the central issue in such research is not really the escalation or transformation 
of conflict, but rather the calculation beforehand of the possibilities that a given course of 
social change will eventuate into struggle rather than some other outcome. Studies in 
predicting the termination of conflict are, by the same logic, attempts to predict 
scientifically the de-escalation of non-legitimate conflict. That is, they seek to calculate 
the possibilities of reducing non-legitimate conflict to permissible forms of struggle 
(Himes, 1980:149). 
 
Dahrendorf (1958:181) constructed theoretical models for the prediction of the escalation 
or de-escalation of both the violence and the intensity of conflict. He wrote that the “level 
of violence” which constitutes a “manifestation” of conflict determined by the “weapons” 
chosen by conflict groups, “varies on a scale from zero to one”. Dahrendorf’s model 
permits prediction of the escalation or de-escalation of violence by assessing the variable 
effects of five structural factors. The predictive model can be summarized as follows.  
 
The increase or decrease of violence is predictively linked to variations of selected, 
empirically observable elements of the social structure, including: relative effectiveness 
of internal organization and control of the conflict’s groups; relative imposition of 
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separate conflicts; relative level of real or imagined deprivation; relative openness to 
outsiders of the status rank system; and relative adequacy and appropriateness of social 
control. Predictions of increase or decrease of violence along the 0-1 scale depend upon 
reading or estimating variations of the cluster of five empirically observable structural 
elements (Himes, 1980:150). 
 
Dahrendorf (1958:182), also constructed a model for predicting the conflict intensity, 
which was defined as “energy expenditure and degree of involvement” by parties to a 
conflict. Variations of the following empirically observable structural factors were said to 
control increase or decrease of conflict intensity: relative conditions of class organization; 
relative separation or superimposition of class conflicts within different associations; 
relative dissociation or superimposition of group conflicts in the same society; relative 
dissociation within an association of the distribution of authority from the distribution of 
rewards and facilities; and relative openness of classes (Himes, 1980:151).   
 
2.4.6 Preliminary Conclusion 
Therefore, Dahrendorf (1958:182) suggests that conflicts are present whenever people 
have differential access to power and authority. Conflicts between individuals, groups, 
and nations are an inherent aspect of human existence. They are pervasive, and are part of 
the very process of interdependence; therefore the seeds of conflict are present at all 
times. He further went on to assert that the initiating structure of conflict is composed of 
social categories of unequal rank and power and divergent interests between which there 
is an ongoing relationship of cooperation and conflict. The degree of potential for 
increased conflict implicit in this structural situation is conditioned by such factors as: 
polarization of the categories by status and power disparity; diverse, immobilized and 
unfocused interests; and definitions of the categories as in and out groups.  
 
Internal and external forces impinge upon the structure, altering the ranks, power, 
functions, and relations among constituent categories in the direction of either expanded 
cooperation or increased conflict. The articulation of manifested interests, the 
organization of conflict groups, and the increase of conflict are facilitated by the 
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intervention of certain variable technical, political, social, and psychological conditions. 
Dahrendorf (1958:183) concludes that once this complex process is complete, conflict 
groups have emerged and stand in a conflict potential relationship within associational 
structure of the social system. Conflict, as a social process, may take various forms and 
lead to certain outcomes. 
 
Based on the above analysis of social conflict using Dahrendorf’s (1958: 183) theory of 
social conflict, one can therefore conclude that social conflict is part of human nature. It 
does, however, depend on different variables that contribute towards a conflict situation. 
Therefore, social conflict is subjective in that it depends on the different components 
(power, prestige and scarce resources) in which the conflict emerges. 
 
 
2.5 ECONOMIC FACTORS AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT 
 
Many, if not most, deep rooted conflicts involve human needs which are universal across 
cultures and economic systems. Compared to culture and ideology, human needs cannot 
be altered and thus social, political and economic institutions have to be adjusted to the 
demand for satisfaction of basic needs. Human needs cannot be satisfied in exploitative 
and unjust social conditions (Burton, 1990:36). Given that a process for conflict 
resolution has to be geared towards fulfilling basic needs, conflicts are unlikely to be 
resolved by power based, coercive bargaining strategies. Marginalized groups do not see 
any stake in cooperating with dominant groups if the solutions do not guarantee their 
rights to self-identity, freedom, autonomy and physical well-being. 
 
The survival of human beings and communities of human beings depends on their ability 
to satisfy their material needs. It is also a fact that the satisfaction of these needs rarely 
takes place in an even or just manner. Whereas some individuals or groups might enjoy a 
surplus of needs satisfaction, the needs of others will remain only partially satisfied or 
perhaps even totally unsatisfied. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are most 
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often expressed collectively (Burton, 1990:37). 2
 
 When authority fails to address such 
grievances, a niche is created for the development of protracted social conflict.  
2.5.1 Basic Needs 
Needs are an integral part of the human being (Burton, 1990:36). Maslow and many 
others have argued that in addition to the more obvious biological needs of food and 
shelter, there are basic human needs that relate to growth and development. There cannot 
be learning and development by an infant until there is an identity separate from the 
mother’s. Then there must be consistency in response if language and behaviour are to be 
learned. Human needs in individuals and identity groups who are engaged in ethnic and 
identity struggles have this same fundamental character.  
 
From the perspective of conflict studies, the important observation is that these needs will 
be pursued by all means available. In ontological terms, the individual is conditioned by 
biology or by a primordial influence to pursue them. It follows that unless satisfied within 
the norms of society, they will lead to behaviour that is outside the legal norms of the 
society. The issue whether behaviour is determined genetically or environmentally, or by 
both, is not a profitable one for us to engage in at this stage. The fact that there are 
behaviours that cannot be controlled to fit the requirements of particular societies is our 
concern, rather than the evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon (Burton, 1990:36). 
 
 
Resources have been central to international conflict throughout history, sometimes 
having a starring role but more frequently pushed into the background. However, the 
history of resources in conflict divides into three parts: cause, mechanisms, and 
outcomes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Protracted social conflicts refers to conflict situations which are characterized by the prolonged and often 
violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, and acceptance, fair 
access to political institutions and economic participation.  
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, it is necessary to revisit the central research question at the core of this 
chapter. The central research question addressed in this chapter as outlined in Chapter 
One is: In what respect can we view contemporary theories as a response to the changing 
conflict context? The focus of this chapter has been on theories dealing with the socio-
economic dimension of conflict as far as a contemporary conflict theory is concerned.  
 
Using the socio-economic aspects of the nature of the conflict highlighted in this chapter 
as a point of departure, it would seem in the light of the preceding discussion that 
contemporary conflict theories addressing the socio-economic dimension of conflict do 
indeed represent a response to the changing conflict context. This brings us to the second 
aspect of the research question, mainly the extent to which contemporary conflict theories 
represent a departure from previous conflict theories.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONFLICT BACKGROUND 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the conflict in North-South Sudan, 
this chapter will provide an overview of the historical and geographic context of the 
conflict in the North-South. In doing so, the section will examine historical factors that 
have contributed to the exacerbation of the conflict; amongst those are the issue of 
identity and the shortage of natural resources. 
 
3.2 GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Sudan is located in north-eastern Africa. It is bordered by Egypt to the north, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and the Red Sea to the east, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the south, and Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic to the west.  It is 
the largest country in Africa with a total area of 2.5 million km2
 
. The White and Blue 
Nile Rivers meet in Khartoum, Sudan. The south is generally tropical and the north is 
arid desert. The rainy season runs from April to October. The terrain of the country is 
generally characterised as a flat, featureless plain with mountains in the east and the west 
(BBC NEWS, 2008). 
 Sudan has a population of about 36 million people comprising more than 140 different 
ethno-linguistic groups. Some estimates suggest that at least 400 different languages are 
spoken in Sudan. Black Africans make up more than 52% of the country’s population and 
include the Azande, Dinka, Nuer and Shiluk peoples. While African Sudanese comprise 
the majority of the population, they are mostly concentrated in the southern fifth of the 
country. By far the majority of the population (70-75%) adheres to some form of Islam. 
Most of the Southern Sudanese adhere to either traditional beliefs (25%) or some form of 
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Christianity (5%). Arabic is the official language. While spoken by about 51% of the 
population as a first language, it is used as a second language by many more people. 
English is also widely spoken. The Sudanese population is extremely diverse, not only in 
its ethnic characteristics but also in its religion and way of life (BBC NEWS, 2008). 
 
3.2.1 Natural Resources 
A wide range of mineral resources exist in Sudan. But by far the major natural resource 
of Sudan is petroleum. In addition to petroleum, natural gas constitutes a major natural 
resource. Petroleum is the most important wealth with commercially proven potential and 
prospects for additional reserves. A steady rise in the revenue from the export of oil has 
been registered. In 2000, revenue from oil export constituted 43.1% of the total revenue 
and the contribution grew to 48.6% in 2005. Currently, the revenue from oil export 
supersedes all other non-oil exports put together (World Bank, 2006).  
3.2.1.1 Mineral Resources 
  
Other mineral resources include gold, iron ore, copper, zinc, chromate and manganese. 
Gold is mined around the Red Sea hills. The mining and exports of gold is on the rise. 
Other non-ferrous resources such as plaster, lime and black sand are also available in 
appreciable quantities and are potentially tradable (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Sudan has groundwater resources that are shared with a number of neighbouring 
countries.  It shares the Nile, which is the main surface water supply resource, with 10 
countries namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. It also shares the Gash and Barka, which 
come from Eritrea, and the Azum, which flows to Chad. The Nubian sandstone aquifer is 
shared among Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Chad (Ministry of Environment and Physical 
Development, 2003).  
3.2.1.2 Water Resources 
  
Sudan is drained by the Nile. About 60% of the Nile basin falls within Sudan. However, 
according to the 1959 agreement with Egypt, Sudan’s share of the Nile water accounts 
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for only 22% of the Nile water. The Nile Basin countries have set up the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI) which is aimed at establishing regional cooperation and mutually 
beneficial relationships among the basin countries (Nile Basin Initiative). The NBI has 
opened the door for the negotiation of a new agreement which may possibly change the 
dynamics of water usage in Sudan and the remaining countries of the basin (Nile Basin 
Initiative).  
  
The groundwater storage has not been quantified yet. It is said that Sudan is beyond the 
threshold of water scarcity and is entering the range of water stress (Sudan Ministry of 
Environment and Physical Development, 2003).  
 
3.2.1.3 Land Utilization
About one third of the total area of the country constitutes arable land. It is only 21% of 
this arable land that is actually utilized for purposes of cultivation. Pasture and forests 
account for over 40% of the total area of Sudan. It is natural pasture that provides grazing 
land for nearly all livestock. The population’s demand for consumption of wood products 
is met by forests and woodlands. This demand is estimated at 16.8 million cubic meters 
in 1996. As a result, forests are exposed to continuous removal and clearance. Land 
clearing for agricultural expansion and for firewood consumption is the major reason for 
forest clearing (Sudan Ministry of Environment and Physical Development, 2003). 
  
 
A countrywide environmental assessment carried out in 2006 highlighted land 
degradation as the most significant environmental concern. Over-cutting, over-
cultivation, and over-grazing have led to environmental degradation in the northern part 
of Sudan. Deforestation is driven principally by energy needs and agricultural clearance. 
The resulting degradation has led to frequent episodes of drought. The problem of 
degradation is acute in the semi-arid regions of Darfur and central Sudan (UNEP, 2007).   
3.2.1.4 Key Environmental Concerns 
  
Another concern relates to the shortage of water. Sudan suffers from a chronic shortage 
of fresh water. Water distribution is extremely unequal, with major regional, seasonal and 
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annual variations. Underlying this variability is a trend towards generally drier 
conditions. Despite serious water shortages, flooding is another environmental concern in 
Sudan.  The floods occur on the Blue Nile and it is the result of deforestation and 
overgrazing in the river’s upper catchments. The floods have the most serious and 
devastating effects. One of the effects of watershed degradation and associated flooding 
is severe riverbank erosion which is common in the narrow but fertile Nile riverine strip 
(UNEP, 2007). 
 
Other key environmental issues for the emerging oil industry include industrial pollution 
and waste management. The release of effluent from factories and the disposal of water 
associated with crude oil extraction are issues of particular concern. The problem is 
worsened by the fact that industrial wastewater treatment facilities are lacking in the 
country (UNEP, 2007).  
 
 
3.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
3.3.1 Background 
Throughout its independent history, Sudan has been characterized by multiple levels of 
conflict: tensions between the mostly Arab and Islamic northern part of the country and 
the non-Arab and non-Muslim southern part of the country, between secular nationalists 
and religious nationalists, and between various strands of the Muslim community over 
the kind of Islamic society Sudan should be (Furley, 1995:92). 
 
Accordingly to Furley & May (2006:15), modern-day Sudan can trace its history back 
almost 200 years. The state was constructed during the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, 
which was centred in Turkey. The Turks gained control of present day Egypt at the turn 
of the nineteenth century and moved south from their stronghold in Cairo. When the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed in the late 1880s, the British Government moved into Egypt, 
coveting the newly opened Suez Canal. Seizing control of Egypt and the canal thus 
enabled Britain to control the sea route from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. 
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The British became involved in Sudan on the pretext of stopping the slave trade there. 
The British were ousted from Sudan by the Mahdists for a decade (1888-1898). When 
they returned, they chose to rule Sudan through Egyptian administrators in what came to 
be known as “condominium rule.” When Egypt gained independence in 1922, Britain, 
wanting to control the strategically important Nile River Valley, became more involved 
in Sudan (Elnur, 2009:20). 
 
Historically, the social elite were Sudanese Arabs who could claim some connections to 
the great families of Arabia, with presumed ties to the prophet Muhammad. While the 
British allowed these northern Islamic elites to flourish, after 1922 they sought to keep 
Islam from spreading south, where they envisioned the development of a local 
administration under the control of southern bureaucrats. In 1930, they introduced what 
they termed the “Southern Policy,” aimed at erecting and enforcing barriers to 
penetration of the south by northerners and stopping the spread of not only Islam but also 
trade (Furley, 1995:93). In place for 20 years, the policy did little to move the south 
forward in terms of development or self-rule. In retrospect, it perpetuated the inequality 
and had devastating consequences for the south when it was incorporated into an 
independent Sudan. When nationalist politics began to accelerate in the 1950s, there was 
also an attempt to develop a sense of Sudanese national consciousness in the south. After 
the unification of the north and the south in 1947, the move toward independence 
occurred rapidly, despite the fact that the nationalist movement was rather disorganized, 
with most groups agreeing only that the British should leave. There was no clear vision 
about what the future of Sudan should be. 
 
The main beneficiaries of the British exit strategy for Sudan were the northern sectarian 
leaders who sought to protect their own class and group interests. The Mahdists and the 
Khatimiyya sect had built vast business and agricultural empires during the colonial 
period. There were some secular nationalists in the north, but they did not seriously 
challenge the power of the religious groups. They generally saw the move to 
independence only in terms of what came to be known as “Sudanization”, the process of 
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replacing colonial administrators with nationals. As independence approached, gross 
inequalities between the north and the south remained, and political developments were 
too fast-paced for southerners to organize and become effectively involved (Meckenkamp 
et al., 1999:20). 
 
Northern Islamic Arabs had a vision of Sudan that was driven by their religious 
convictions more than anything else and did not attend to the need to allay the fears of 
many southerners. Many southerners came to feel that a benevolent, if neglectful, British 
colonial rule was being replaced by a tyrannical Arab and Muslim post-colonial 
government bent on Islamicizing the entire country. Consequently, they felt they had to 
find an exit strategy for their group or to engage in pre-emptive attacks against the 
northerners (Furley, 1995:94). While Muslim politicians publicly claimed their respect 
for the quality of all Sudanese citizens, for many southerners this commitment was not 
credible. Some explained their mistrust of the northerners as stemming from memories of 
the slave trade. Such mistrust led to a mutiny by Southern Sudanese soldiers at the Torit 
Barracks in the Equatoria province in August 1955. Widespread killing of northerners in 
the south followed. The new interim Government of the National Unionist Party 
retaliated, but Sudan nonetheless achieved independence on January 1, 1956. 
Independence was achieved in Sudan at the same time that southerners were mobilizing 
for civil war, a conflict that has continued to the present with only an 11 year respite 
between 1972 and 1983 (Petterson, 2003:40).  
 
A military coup in 1958 brought civilian rule to an abrupt end. This military regime was 
itself deposed in 1964 by a popular uprising known as the “October Revolution”. The 
newly elected government of Muhamad Ahmed Mahjoub was ousted in 1969 by a 
military coup headed by Ga’afar al-Numeiri, with the support of the Sudan Communist 
Party. In 1971 there was a failed coup attempt against Numeiri that was thought to be a 
communist plot. Subsequently the coup plotters were executed and Numeiri moved away 
from his superpower patron, the Soviets, and toward the United States. Numeiri also 
moved quickly to find a political solution with southern rebels, which was reached with 
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the signing in 1972 of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Nimeiri attempted to build trust 
among southerners, granting them a measure of regional autonomy (Furley, 1995:95). 
  
However, in 1977 hard-line Islamists began to demand a revision of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law). By the early 1980s, Numeiri 
had begun to capitulate to the demands of the fundamentalists, distancing himself from 
the south. On June 5, 1983, he issued “Republican Order Number One”, abrogating the 
Addis Ababa Agreement and returning regional powers to the central government; he 
later declared Sudan an Islamic state. These acts triggered Sudan’s second civil war and 
the mobilization of southerners by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In 
contrast to the south’s first resistance movement, the SPLA did not prioritize regional 
autonomy, calling instead for Sudan to be transformed into a multi-racial, multi-religious, 
and multiethnic democratic state (Furley et al, 2006:95).  
 
Despite having capitulated to the fundamentalists, Nimeiri, his regime and his military 
were widely viewed by the population at large as weak and too closely tied to the United 
States. The regime was over-thrown in a popular uprising supported by the military in the 
spring of 1985. National elections followed, and Sadiq al-Mahdi came to head up a 
coalition civilian government. This regime however lasted only four years; it was 
deposed by General Omar Hassan Amad al-Bashir in a military coup d’état on June 30, 
1989. Bashir immediately cancelled all prior agreements and acted quickly to eliminate 
opponents and consolidate his power. He revoked the constitution of 1985, abolished 
parliament, banned political parties and detained their leaders, closed all newspapers, 
and, most importantly, intensified the war in the south (Day & Doyle, 1986:96). 
 
The political opposition went underground, into the bush and into exile. The National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), an umbrella organization that comprised a number of 
political opposition groups (including the SPLA) as well as armed and unarmed northern 
and southern organizations, professional associations, and trade unions, were founded in 
1989 (Furley, 1995:96). 
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Moreover, an important party to the conflict was the Sudan People’s Defence Forces 
(SPDF), formed in 1991, after splitting from the SPLM/A. For 11 years, until 2002, the 
SPLM/A and SPDF fought intense battles over the control of territory in the south. On 
January 6, 2002, the leaders of these two groups signed a declaration merging their 
movements (Boulden, 2003:188).  
 
Over time, what was initially defined as a north-south conflict has evolved into a series of 
conflicts, buttressed by varying elements including religion, race, lack of rule of law, 
geopolitical and strategic interests. In recent years, especially since the resumption of the 
war in 1983, the identity of the nation has become acutely contested. Whereas the north 
draws its identity from Islam and Arabization, the southern identity is best understood as 
one of resistance to the north. The rebels in the south stand against Islamic identity and 
assimilation (Boulden, 2003:188). 
 
Nonetheless, critical as the identity question is, it is not the only issue to define and shape 
this war. Developments in the last three decades have gradually and consistently changed 
the nature of the conflict from a classic ethno-religious conflict to one mainly over 
resources. In this configuration, the economic and resource crisis in the north has become 
the driving force in the civil war. In these three decades the subterranean resources of 
Sudan, especially its oil, have become catalysts to the war (Silva & Samarasinghe, 
1993:10). 
 
According to Boulden (2003:188), since 1999 the Sudan Government has been earning 
hundreds and millions of dollars from royalties paid by foreign companies exploring and 
drilling oil. This provides the government with greater means to acquire armaments. 
Furthermore, it offers a greater motive to accelerate its assault on disfavoured groups. On 
the whole this situation acts as a disincentive for the government to remain committed to 
the peace process. To facilitate unabated exploration and extraction of oil, which it 
continues to encourage, the government is involved in the accelerated removal of 
populations from resource rich areas. This is pursued through tactics such as a scorched 
earth policy, torture and terror. 
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Convinced that it could defeat the rebellion militarily, the government intensified the war 
within its borders. Citing security concerns, it decided to deal with the “southern 
problem” by military means and increased its acquisition and stockpiling of arms from its 
global suppliers. In addition, the government undertook national mobilization in defence 
of the “motherland”. Around this rallying call, the government created, sponsored and 
protected armed militias that have become notorious in terrorizing civilian populations 
deemed to be supporters of the rebellion (Boulden, 2003:188). 
 
The dynamics of this war weave into the entire Horn of Africa region, with unpleasant 
regional implications. Throughout the 1990s, this war was a source of heightening 
tensions in the Horn of Africa. Sudan accused nearly all its neighbours, namely Ethiopia, 
Uganda, and Eritrea of opening doors and supporting groups engaged in destabilizing it. 
In particular, it blamed them for providing an outlet and support for the main rebel group 
in the south, the SPLA. It also charged that these governments were supporting the 
internal resistance fermenting in Northern Sudan, in opposition to the government’s 
attempt to consolidate and enforce its vision of the Islamic Sharia law. In 1995, Egypt 
joined the list of unhappy neighbours, accusing Sudan of sponsoring Islamic 
“fundamentalist” groups from the Middle East associated with the attempted 
assassination of President Hosni Mubarak. As Sudan and its neighbours pointed fingers at 
each other, the 1990s were marked by heightened insecurity that almost dragged the Horn 
of Africa into a full-fledged regional war (Meckenkamp et al., 1999:25). 
 
A confluence of these factors has unleashed a deepening humanitarian crisis, with 
multiple negative consequences. Since 1983, it has caused an estimated two million 
deaths, seen more than four million people displaced internally, impoverished the 
populations of Southern Sudan, perpetrated torture, degrading and inhuman treatment. 
All of this resulted in Africa’s largest relief operation under the banner of the United 
Nations (UN), namely Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) (Elnur, 2009:30). 
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The war has also caused massive refugee outflows that are an enormous burden to the 
region. At the end of 2000, official estimates indicated that over a quarter of a million 
Sudanese had sought asylum in neighbouring countries: Uganda (166,000), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (30,000), Kenya (60,000), Central African 
Republic (35,000), Chad (25,000) and Ethiopia (59,000). This enormous movement 
across borders is paralleled by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
associated with increased insecurity. Border areas are particularly vulnerable and bear the 
brunt of violence. For instance, the border axis between Kenya, Sudan and Uganda has 
become a fierce battlefield, with cattle rustling between the Toposa (from Sudan), 
Turkana (Kenya) and Karamajong (Uganda), escalating to unprecedented levels 
(Meckenkamp, 1999:40).  
 
 
3.3.2 The Identity Factor 
According to Deng (1997:2), ironically, the civil war is the result of the country’s greatest 
promise as a microcosm of Africa and a bridge or cross-roads between the continent and 
the Middle East. The racial, ethnic, cultural and religious diversities in Sudan’s 
composition are most often described as falling into north and south dimensions. The 
north comprises two thirds of the country in terms of land and population and is inhabited 
by indigenous tribal groups, with the dominant group intermarrying with incoming Arab 
traders over the period preceding Islam (but heightened by the advent of Islam in the 
seventh century), to produce a genetically mixed African-Arab racial and cultural 
identity.    
 
These Afro-Arab Sudanese, however, see themselves simply as Arabs, despite the visible 
African element in their skin colour and physical features. There are, however, non-Arab 
communities in the north, which though large in numbers proportional to the Arabized 
tribes, have been partially assimilated by their conversion to Islam and their adoption of 
Arabic as the language of communication with the other tribes (Deng, 1997:2). It is in the 
south that the remaining third of the country, in terms of land and population, that the 
African identity in its racial and cultural composition has withstood assimilation into 
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Arabism and Islam. Northern incursions southward met with strong resistance, dating 
back to the hostile encounters of the slave trade that peaked in the nineteenth century 
(Elnur, 2009:35). 
 
The British colonial policy of administering the north and the south separately reinforced 
Arabism and Islam in the north, encouraged southern development along indigenous 
African lines, and introduced Christian missionary education and rudiments of Western 
culture as elements of modernisation in the south. Interaction between the two sets of 
people was strongly discouraged (Meckenkamp, 1999:45). 
 
While British administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social, and 
cultural development of the north, the south remained isolated, secluded and 
undeveloped. The principal objective of colonial rule in the region was the establishment 
and maintenance of law and order. (Deng, 1997:3). 
 
Since independence, the preoccupying concern among the northerners has been to correct 
the divisive effect of the separatist policies of the colonial administration by pursuing the 
assimilation of the south through Arabization and Islamization, which the south has 
resisted (Mwagiru, 2006:45). 
 
The political impasse created by the situation in the south contributed to the military 
takeover in 1958, only two years after independence, with the aim of pursuing the 
strategies of Arabization and Islamization more vigorously. The ruthlessness with which 
these assimilation policies were pursued in the south aggravated the conflict, which 
became a full-fledged civil war in the 1960s. The effect of that war on the political 
situation led to the popular uprising that overthrew the military regime in 1964 (Mwagiru, 
2006:46). The oppressive policies toward the south were temporarily relaxed. The 
government organised a round table conference on the problem of the south. The 
conference rejected separation or self-determination, but mandated a Twelve Men 
Committee to formulate an appropriate constitutional arrangement that would reconcile 
 48 
southern demands with the preservation of national unity. The Committee recommended 
regional autonomy for the south (Deng, 1997:3). 
 
Parliamentary democracy was, however, restored before the Committee’s 
recommendations could be implemented by the interim government. With the return of 
democracy, the ruling political parties resumed the assimilation policies with a 
vengeance. As the violence escalated, the difference between the north and the south 
became sharper, and the level of political instability rose (Deng, 1997:4). 
 
This vicious cycle was broken in 1969 when another military junta, this time under the 
leadership of Jaafar Mohammed Numeiri, seized power in alliance with the Communist 
Party. This party believed in autonomy for the south, provided the region first accepted 
socialism; something southerners resisted. After displaying an ambivalent attitude toward 
the rebels following the abortive coup of 1971, when the leftist elements in the 
government tried to take power from within, Numeiri’s regime eventually negotiated with 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and in 1972 concluded the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, which, based on the recommendations of the Twelve Men Committee, 
granted the south regional autonomy with a democratic parliamentary system (Petterson, 
2003:56). 
 
The regime, however, remained under pressure from the conservative and radical Islamic 
elements, in particular the sectarian parties and the Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan El 
Muslimeen), a radical rightist religious group with whom Numeiri eventually entered into 
an uneasy alliance. Although Numeiri underwent a personal conversion, becoming a 
born-again Muslim, he hoped that through religious reforms he could pull the rug from 
under the feet of the sectarian opposition leader. He also wanted to remove the anomaly 
of liberal democracy in the south, which was incongruous with the national system of an 
authoritarian presidency. Numeiri gradually eroded southern autonomy and moved 
relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law, Shari’a, and establishing an Islamic state. 
Finally, he unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by dividing the 
south into three regions and ordering the transfer of southern troops to the north. This 
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triggered the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its 
military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), under the leadership of John 
Garang de Mabior (Elnur, 2009:35). 
 
To the surprise of most people, the declared objective of the movement was not 
secession, but the creation of a new, secular, democratic and pluralistic Sudan. Within 
only two years of the resumption of hostilities, a popular uprising, intifada, largely 
fuelled by the military situation in the south, led to Nimeiri’s own demise in April 1985. 
Most northerners expected the SPLM/SPLA to put down their arms and ride the 
democratic wave. But the movement remained committed to the creation of the new 
Sudan, which posed an even greater threat than secession to the Arab-Islamic 
establishment of the north (Deng, 1997:5). 
 
After Numeiri was overthrown, the Muslim Brothers reorganised themselves into a 
broader based political party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), which won the third 
largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986. The Front’s Islamic 
national agenda was endorsed and significantly reinforced when General Omar Hassan 
al-Bashir, in alliance with the NIF, seized power on June 30, 1989, in the name of the 
Revolution for National Salvation. The SPLM/SPLA condemned the coup as an Islamist 
move engineered by the NIF and secretly committed to the division of the country along 
religious lines. The movement agreed, however, to enter into peace talks with the 
government (Deng, 1997:5). The talks immediately broke down as a result of the 
characterisation of the problem as ‘southern’ rather than ‘national’, the implication being 
a fundamental disagreement on the objective of restructuring the system toward creating 
a new Sudan. 
 
Further talks, which have been sponsored by various mediators over the years, have 
raised issues such as pluralistic democracy, separation of religion and state, and the right 
of self-determination, all of which have been extremely contentious. As a result, these 
talks appear to be in the realm of public relations rhetoric, and no appreciable progress 
has been made on the peace front so far.      
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3.3.3 Participants, Power and Interests 
The configuration of the conflict has become paradoxically both over-simplified into a 
religiously based ideological dualism and complicated by factionalism on both sides of 
the divide. The main dichotomy remains north-south, but significant differences both in 
the north and the south have emerged partly as a struggle for power among the leaders 
and partly because of genuine differences in the visions they have for the country (Deng, 
1997:6).   
 
The source of power and interests at stake remain centred on the issue of national identity 
and its implications to participation in public life, the sharing of power and national 
wealth, and the overall impact on the status of citizens. Since religion (Islam), ethnicity 
(Arab), language (Arabic) and Arab culture in general are seen as intertwined, 
southerners, non-Muslims of the north also suffer from discrimination based on these 
factors (Meckenkamp, 1999:47).   
 
The current struggle over national identity is reflected at two principal levels. One level 
has to do with the configuration of the Sudanese identity in light of historical processes 
that have left the peoples with layers of civilisations, racial characteristics, and cultural 
traditions. The other concerns the repercussions for unity in a pluralistic modern nations 
state in which the conflict between the identities that give the country its geopolitical 
significance now threaten the nation with disintegration (Furley, 1995:35). 
 
The crisis of national identity manifests itself in two corresponding sets of discrepancies. 
One is the gap between self-perceptions of identity (what people claim to be) and the 
reality of what they are as determined by objective factors. The other is the gap between 
how individual groups perceive themselves or are perceived objectively and how the 
national framework is defined (Furley, 2006:24). 
 
What makes the identity crisis in Sudan particularly acute is the fact that the policies of 
the various governments since independence have tried to fashion the entire country on 
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the basis of their Arab-Islamic identity. The south, with a bitter historical memory and a 
colonial legacy of separate development in the modern context, remains decidedly 
resistant to racial, cultural, and religious assimilation into the Arab-Islamic mold of the 
north. It is, however, not the mere fact of integration of African and Arab elements to 
which the south is opposed; rather, it is the political domination of the south by the north 
and the imposition of their racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious elements of identity on 
the whole country which the south uncompromisingly opposes (Deng, 1997:6). 
 
The Islamic fundamentalists in the north and the secular revolutionaries in the south 
represent the competing counterparts of parallel identities, which have now come into 
intensive contact within a unitary state system and are offering alternative visions for the 
nation. One observer noted: “What we are witnessing is the clash of two antagonistic 
cultural outlooks, both of which are experiencing a revival” (Day & Doyle, 1986:14). 
 
Within the north, opposition to the Islamist regime comprises not only the secularists 
represented by the ‘modern forces’ such as intellectuals, professional associations, trade 
economists and the like, but also the traditional political parties, which, while religiously 
based on sectarian grounds, do not share the agenda of the National Islamic Front with 
whom they are in competition for religiously based power (Deng, 1997:7). 
 
In the south, while the vision of the new Sudan advocated by the leadership is accepted as 
a pragmatic way of winning support inside the country, in Africa and from the 
international community, most southerners given a choice would prefer secession. In 
August 1991, several members of the leadership, having concluded that the creation of a 
new Sudan was at best long-term and at worst utopian, rebelled against the leadership of 
John Garang, unsuccessfully sought to overthrow him, and openly called for secession. 
Ironically, while calling for secession, which the government categorically rejects, this 
group allegedly entered into a political and military alliance with the government against 
the mainstream. The group has, however, continued to splinter and has largely lost 
credibility (Elnur, 2009:32). 
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While the rebel factions did not succeed in overthrowing Garang or moving the south 
toward its goal, they have influenced the political agenda of the movement. The 
SPLM/SPLA now combines its objective of a new Sudan with a demand for self-
determination for the south. John Garang, the leader of the movement, still maintains that 
there is no conflict between the goal of a new united Sudan and the demand for self-
determination. Indeed, he sees the two as inseparable. In his view, the creation of a new 
Sudan is a process which will begin, and has indeed begun, in the south and then spread 
northward. If the right conditions are created, self-determination could end up with a 
reaffirmation of unity (Deng, 1997:8). But if it should result in southerners opting for 
secession, an independent south would continue to cooperate with like-minded 
northerners, in particular the non-Arab ethnic and regional groups, toward transforming 
the old Arab-Islamic Sudan into the new Sudan, where race, ethnicity, religion and 
culture will not be grounds for discrimination. Meanwhile, the call for preserving the 
unity of restructured Sudan should rally opposition groups in the north to join forces with 
the southern based SPLM/SPLA, reinforcing its capacity to achieve its multi-faceted 
objectives. 
 
 
3.4 CONFRONTATION OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES 
 
According to Solomon (2003:150), the conflict over equitable distribution of wealth has 
its roots in the 1973 Constitution which incorporated the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords. 
This constitution provided the central government with more powers to make decisions 
on economic development in the south than had originally been envisioned by the 
accords. These powers enabled Nimeiri to intervene directly in decisions concerning 
wealth sharing. He goes on to argue that, in fact, southern people got little from the 
economic plans of the Nimeiri government and thus remained marginalised. 
 
The regime’s continued attempts to exploit the south are contributing factors to the 
resumption of hostilities. When Chevron discovered oil in Southern Sudan in 1974, for 
instance, the government redrew the boundaries of the area to ensure that the oil and 
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refinery would be located in the north. The government also planned to construct the 
Jonglei Canal (a joint project between Sudan and Egypt) to divert waters from the south 
to Egypt, which caused a wave of riots and protests that the southern government found 
exceedingly difficult to contain (Solomon, 2003:150). 
 
Numeiri’s reaction to these growing demands was to eventually abolish the regional 
autonomy of the south, which he now viewed as a threat to his new policy of 
rapprochement with the northern conservatives. This was achieved through dividing the 
south into three separately governed regions and the imposition of Arabic as the official 
language (Deng, 1997:12). 
 
The increasing polarisation of the south, coupled with Numeiri’s gradual gravitation 
towards the conservatives and the abolition of southern autonomy, set the stage for the 
resumption of war. Sensing the growing restlessness of the south, Numeiri started the 
process of transferring southern military units to the north, in an attempt to weaken the 
capacity of the south to resist his unilateral abrogation of the peace process. During this 
process, two units stationed in Bor and Fashalla disobeyed the order to re-deploy. The 
government reacted with massive force to subdue both units, but the operations failed and 
the units eventually coalesced into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Movement 
(SPLM/SPLA), organised and led by Dr John Garang, which has been fighting to restore 
the unity of the country (Solomon, 2003:152).  
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The current conflict in North-South Sudan is firmly embedded within a geographical 
context but more so in a historical context. South Sudan in particular has been badly 
affected, given that it has, as result of a bitter historical memory and a colonial legacy of 
separate development, remained resistant to racial, cultural and religious assimilation into 
the Arab-Islamic model of the north. Successive liberation movements in the south 
continue to oppose the imposition of the racial, cultural, linguistic and religious elements 
of identity on the whole country. 
 
Hence two powerful forces are at play in Sudan. The one is a northern Arab-Islamic 
identity, which continues to define the national identity framework, and the other is an 
African identity that is asserted by the south, which rejects incorporation into the northern 
identity framework and is therefore trying to offer an alternative framework. Failure to 
bridge these two perspectives has led to war of national visions that has raged with 
increasing intensity since 1955.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION IN THE 
NORTH-SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict in Sudan has a very long history (Furley & May, 2006:167). Throughout its 
independent history, Sudan has been characterized by multiple levels of conflict: tensions 
between the mostly Arab and Islamic northern part of the country and the non-Arab and 
non-Muslim southern part of the country (Boulden, 2003:185). 
 
In short, Chapter Two explores the theoretical responses to the aforementioned issues, 
while this chapter’s focus falls on the manifestation of these issues within North-South 
Sudan. The purpose of this chapter is thus to evaluate how well theory and reality mesh 
as far as the North-South conflict in Sudan is concerned. The two central research 
questions, which will guide the discussion in this chapter, are:  
• Does an analysis of the socio-economic dimension of the conflict in North-
South Sudan support the findings of contemporary conflict theories?  
• If so, should the socio-economic dimension of the conflict in North-South 
Sudan be taken into consideration during the formulation of peace 
agreements?  
 
The objective of this study is not to provide a definite and universally conclusive answer 
as to whether belligerents are primarily motivated by social or economic considerations 
but rather to illuminate the presence of an influential socio-economic dimension in 
conflict and argue for its inclusion in agreements.  
 
By doing so, assuming Mitchell’s (1981) theory of the ‘triadic conflict structure’, the 
current analysis intends to examine the ‘behavioural manifestations’ and the underlying 
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dynamics at play in the North-South Sudan conflict.  In other words, as opposed to trying 
to provide solutions to the conflict, the purpose of this chapter is to use it as a case study 
in the aim of assessing the relevance of Mitchell’s theory in a practical context. In that 
respect, the first part of the analysis will provide a brief overview of the key arguments of 
the triadic conflict structure as defined by Mitchell. Once identified, these key elements 
will respectively be adapted to the North-South Sudan conflict in order to determine 
whether they constitute a ‘faithful’ theoretical framework of analysis or not. We will 
critically look at the way the triadic conflict structure accounts for specific aspects of the 
conflict and examine the limits of these accounts, if any. Then the final section will make 
concluding remarks on the relevance of the triadic conflict structure in the analysis of 
intra-national conflicts with external influences and stakeholders, such as the North-
South Sudan crisis.  
 
4.1.1 The Triadic Structure of Conflict: A Brief Overview  
Conflict can be described as a contentious process of interpersonal or inter-group 
interaction that takes place within a larger social context (Jeong, 1999:3). As sources of 
grievances are often associated with structural injustice, the most serious conflict 
encompasses various types of social problems reflected in inter-group relations. Thus 
inter-group conflict is often imbedded in a political framework, and its meaning can be 
socially interpreted and constructed. 
 
Conflict entails material bases of social life as well as psychological. While changes in 
enemy perceptions are necessary for collaborative problem solving, building a new 
relationship would have to go beyond removing misperceptions of adversaries (Korzenny 
& Toomey, 1990:56). Conflict resolution is ingrained in the analysis of inter-group 
dynamics as well as the process and outcome of negotiating different values and 
incompatible interests (Mwaura & Schmeidi, 2002:43). The resolution of violent conflicts 
is usually considered a politically desirable objective. It saves human lives, prevents the 
internal disorganization of nations and restores stability in their external relations 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005:63). Conflict resolution is a path to peace, at least to a negative 
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peace, and serves other values, such as social order and economic development, as well 
(Keating & Knight, 2004:263).  
 
According to Mitchell (1981), all conflicts present a three-dimensional character of inter-
connected components, which transcends the common understanding of the concept of 
‘conflict’ as mere violent behaviour between two or more parties. The triadic conflict 
structure argues that “efforts to analyse disputes must take account of the existence of 
[the following] three components:  A conflict situation, conflict behaviour, and conflict 
attitudes and perceptions” (Mitchell, 1981:16-17). In this approach, conflicts erupt from a 
situation of perceived goal incompatibility between two or more parties in a given 
society. Put differently, when parties consciously desire and pursue goals that are 
mutually incompatible and therefore can only be achieved at the expenses of one another, 
we are in presence of a conflict situation.  Goal incompatibility itself results from the 
“mismatch between social values and social structures” (Mitchell, 1981:18), whereby 
certain goods are deemed more desirable than others by the value system, thus creating a 
situation of scarcity and competition over their appropriation. Mitchell (1981:22-23) goes 
on to distinguish positive or assertive goals (desiring a specific outcome or objective) 
from negative goals (the avoidance of undesirable future states or outcomes). According 
to him, conflicts involving negative goals from all the sides offer more alternative future 
states that could be mutually accepted as compromises by all the parties.  
 
The second important component in Mitchell’s typology is ‘conflict attitudes’ or “those 
psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both 
conflict situations and resultant conflict behaviours” (Mitchell, 1981:25). He adopts an 
instrumental approach to the question of the role of psychological considerations in 
conflict. In his view, psychological factors do not constitute the prime cause of conflicts 
as claimed by some scholars; instead, they are only emotional orientations and 
perceptions that result from one’s involvement in a conflict situation. However, they may 
cause the exacerbation of the conflict situation and its later escalation.  
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Similarly, conflict behaviour also results from the initial situation of conflict (goal 
incompatibility). Parties will therefore attempt to pursue their own agenda, while trying 
to make their adversaries abandon or modify their goals, through various actions (in the 
broader sense, including actions on oneself or inaction, as long as it is aimed at 
influencing the behaviour of the other parties).  
 
This simplified definition of Mitchell’s triadic conflict merely points out the main 
elements of the theory. How do they apply to the practical example of the North-South 
Sudan conflict?  
 
4.1.2 North-South Sudan Conflict 
Since its onset in 1955, the Sudan civil war has, for most of its history, been a low 
priority on the agenda of the international community, and the United Nations (UN) in 
particular. The genesis of the conflict was a failure by the Sudan Government to honour 
an agreement that provided for a federal system of administration. The most obvious of 
this genesis of the conflict had been the spread of Islam and Arab identities in the north, 
and years of British imperial rule from 1898 to 1956, that encouraged the spread of 
Christianity and African identity in the south. Yet behind these obvious points of 
differentiation between north and south there were also processes of economic imbalance 
as the north took ever-greater control of Sudan’s resources, in conjunction with the 
international penetration of the country’s economy, while the south lagged behind feeling 
first neglected and then increasingly exploited. These differences of perceived identity 
and exploitation were to grow over the years (Boulden, 2003:186). 
 
Tension was present from the time of the attainment of independence in 1956 and as the 
situation deteriorated sustained civil war developed in the early 1960s. It was to last for 
10 years until peace was agreed upon in 1972 at Addis Ababa, which offered the south 
regional autonomy. That peace agreement survived for a further decade until a new 
outbreak of conflict began in 1983, this time to last for over 20 years. Though the 1972 
agreement ultimately failed, it contained two useful lessons. The first was that if the 
circumstances were propitious, previous peace negotiating experience could prove useful. 
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The second was that the perceived shortcomings of the 1972 agreement could inform the 
later processes and perhaps contribute to a more robust formula for peace (Furley, 
2006:62). 
 
The war that began in 1983 was to involve an intensification of the differences mentioned 
above. The growing Islamist movement in Northern Sudan had led to the involvement in 
government from 1977 of the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al – Turabi, and 
to President Nimeiri introducing Sharia or Islamic law in 1983. It was to have a dramatic 
impact on the whole country, including an almost wholly negative effect on Southern 
Sudan. However the position enunciated by the emergent southern guerrilla force, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), put as much emphasis upon the economic and 
social issues. Partly because the SPLA was led by a trained economist, John Garang, 
accusations of economic exploitation by the northern business elite were prominent, but 
so too was identification of that elite as ‘Arab’, in contrast to the ‘African’ self-
perception of the SPLA. The gap was to widen with the coup of 1989 that brought the 
National Islamic Front (NIF), the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, into power. 
The coup itself was to forestall the possibility of a peace agreement that would have at 
least diluted Sharia. And more was to come: the new rulers proclaimed their leadership 
of an Islamic movement that would transform the whole of Sudan and East Africa and 
prove a beacon for the whole Muslim world. The war in the south inevitably intensified 
with both sides giving greater prominence in the struggle to religious themes and 
identities (Furley & May, 2006:168). 
 
Although ethnic identity and religion were key elements to the conflict, there was an 
economic dimension as well: control over natural resources, in particular oil which was 
discovered in the south in 1978. An oil installation of the Chevron Corporation was one 
of the SPLA’s first targets. The discovery of oil in Southern Sudan unearthed a political 
controversy as well, offering southerners an avenue to economic recovery, while 
enhancing the fear of northerners that this new economic wealth would fan the flames of 
southern separatism. The real roots of this conflict can be found in the financial 
arrangements provided for in the Addis Ababa Agreement. That settlement “assigned all 
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central government revenues in the south, realizable from commercial, agricultural and 
industrial activities and services, to regional treasury” (Ali & Matthews, 2004:291).  
 
The central government could have negotiated a new resource sharing agreement with the 
southern regional government, but instead it did everything it could to maintain control 
over the oil and thus deprive the south of this new wealth. First, it introduced a new map 
that redrew the boundary lines in such a manner that the oil was located in the north. 
Faced with stiff opposition, Khartoum decided to build a refinery in the north rather than 
in the south, later reversing that decision and opting for a pipeline to the Red Sea. 
Uncertain as to whether that would assure its control of the oil, the central government 
took the final step of breaking up the southern region, thus ending “what was left of 
southern autonomy once and for all” (Ali & Matthews, 2004:291). 
 
The people of Southern Sudan suffered tremendous hardships during the war. The 
government’s military campaigns targeted specific ethnic groups and included the 
bombing of civilian sites, arbitrary killings and arrests, torture, rape, and abduction of 
women and children. The government also sought to pit rival southern groups against one 
another, causing further harm to the civilians caught in the crossfire. The famine of the 
late 1980s, a humanitarian disaster that put millions of Sudanese at risk of starvation, was 
caused by a combination of drought, violence, population displacements, and aid 
blockages and diversions to combatants. Successive governments have done extremely 
little to ease the grievances of the south. The civil wars between North and South Sudan 
are said to have cost the lives of two million people and displacing a further four million 
people (BBCNEWS, 2008).   
 
4.1.3 Conflict Dynamics 
The dynamics of this conflict would change dramatically, however, and attract 
considerable attention in its second phase. Erupting in 1983, a critical feature of this 
phase was the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A). To date, the 
conflict continues to draw in new actors and interests that complicate attempts to resolve 
it. Its scale and scope have expanded, as has the growing interest in campaigning for its 
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resolution. While the trajectory of this conflict is marked by moments that brought blips 
of hope, most of its history has been one of frustration. Attempts to deliver peace have 
been characterized by a sluggish process of stalemates and ceasefire that have been 
turned into convenient rearmament periods by the parties to the conflict. Over time, the 
scale and magnitude of its humanitarian consequences have multiplied beyond the 
commitment of the campaigns for its resolution (Boulden, 2003:186). 
 
Recently however, the momentum for a peace process in Sudan has increased. This is 
explained by an increasing realization on the part of the international community that the 
conflict is more than a domestic affair. It has interlocking regional, continental and global 
dimensions, with complex implications for conflict resolution. Since the mid 1990s, 
increasing proof points to the involvement of Sudan in international terrorism and support 
for Islamic fundamentalism in global militarism. Regionally, this conflict has sparked off 
a myriad of security and geostrategic concerns. Increasingly, there is a multiplication of 
interests that relate to Sudan’s natural and subterranean wealth, including the Nile waters. 
And finally, there is mounting pressure both within and outside Sudan, by a growing 
constituency that is concerned about issues of governance and human rights in Sudan. 
Unfortunately, this growing interest is hardly matched by action on the ground. 
Compared to other conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, the Sudan conflict remains one of 
the most forgotten human tragedies today. The United Nations have yet to engage fully in 
seeking peace in Sudan. Although regional actors, in particular the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), have initiated a peace process, actors in the region 
remain lukewarm and are hampered by a lack of resources in their attempts to resolve the 
conflict. As local, national, regional and international interests continue to frustrate any 
peace processes, the volume and intensity of destruction, death, morbidity, famine, 
slavery and displacement continues to grow (Boulden, 2003:186). 
 
Attempts to resolve this conflict have remained ad hoc, sporadic and lacking in 
coordination, and dealing with this fragmentation is critical if the problem is to be 
resolved. Besides not engaging at all, the UN have failed to provide guidance, 
coordination or any support to initiatives such as those by IGAD (1993), Egypt and Libya 
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(2000) and Nigeria (1991-1993). Driven by varying, and sometimes conflicting interests, 
each of these initiatives have failed to sustain pressure on the parties to the conflict to 
conclude a valuable peace deal (ICG, 2006).  
 
 
4.2 THE NORTH-SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT SITUATION: GOAL 
INCOMPATIBILITY IN THE APPORTIONMENT OF IDENTITY AND 
OIL RESOURCES 
 
Over time, what was initially defined as a north-south conflict has evolved into a series of 
conflicts, buttressed by varying elements including religion, race, lack of the rule of law, 
geopolitical and strategic interests. In recent years, especially since the resumption of the 
war in 1983, the identity of the nation has become acutely contested. Whereas the north 
draws its identity from Islam and Arabization, the southern identity is best understood as 
one of resistance to the north. The rebels in the south stand against Islamic Identity and 
assimilation (Boulden, 2003:188). 
 
Nonetheless, critical as the identity question is, it is not the only issue to define and shape 
this war. Developments in the last three decades have gradually, and consistently, 
changed the nature of the conflict from a classic ethno-religious conflict to one mainly 
over resources. In this configuration, the economic and resource crisis in the north has 
become the driving force in the civil war. In the past years the subterranean resources of 
Sudan, especially its oil, have become catalysts to the war (Boulden, 2003:188).   
 
Since 1999, the Sudan Government has been earning hundreds of millions of dollars from 
royalties paid by foreign companies exploring and drilling oil. This provides the 
government with greater means to acquire armaments. Furthermore, it offers a greater 
motive to accelerate its assault on disfavoured groups. On the whole this situation acts as 
a disincentive for the government to remain committed to the peace process. 
Unsurprisingly, the military balance has shifted in favour of the government in the last 
past years. To facilitate unabated exploration and extraction of oil, which it continues to 
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encourage, the government is involved in the accelerated removal of populations from 
resource rich areas. This is pursued through tactics such as a scorched earth policy, 
torture and terror (Boulden, 2003:188). 
 
Convinced that it could defeat the rebellion militarily, the government intensified the war 
within its borders. Citing security concerns, it decided to deal with the “southern 
problem” by military means and increased its acquisition and stockpiling of arms from its 
global suppliers. In addition, the government undertook national mobilization in the 
defence of the “motherland”. Around this rallying call, the government created, 
sponsored and protected armed militias that have become notorious in terrorizing civilian 
populations deemed to be supporters of the rebellion (Meckenkamp et al., 1999). 
 
To follow Mitchell’s typology we would argue that the goal pursued by the Sudanese 
government is, in this case, to secure state – and regime – survival by maintaining its grip 
over oil resources. In ‘normal’ cases, where state survival actually implies the protection 
of the people’s interests, this goal would not clash with any part of these population’s 
goals. But in Sudan, which Ali and Matthews (2004:282) describe as a “rentier state”, oil 
and oil-related businesses have become the ‘private property’ of the country’s elite and 
their geographical homelands – which have little or no oil reserves – at the expenses of 
the minorities. Their goals therefore necessarily clash with those of neglected and 
marginalized minorities. Naturally, the Sudanese population’s main goal with regard to 
the government’s policies is to benefit more from what they consider ‘their oil resources’. 
They therefore demand a greater share in the redistribution of oil revenues, local 
infrastructure building (schools, roads, hospitals, etc.) and development projects that 
would lift communities out of poverty. From the multinational corporations (MNCs) 
operating in the region, the indigenes demand compensation for the ecological damages 
caused by oil exploitation and they ask for more environmentally-friendly practices of oil 
exploitation. No need to mention that these demands clash with the very essence of what 
such businesses are all about: maximising profit at the lowest costs possible, even if this 
means not taking responsibility for the environmental damages caused by their 
operations.  
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In that sense, one has to agree with Mitchell (1981:17-19) that a condition of reciprocal 
incompatibility of goals between various parties in a given society results in a conflict 
situation. Moreover, the system of values espoused by the three parties mentioned earlier 
– and the rest of the population for that matter – has established oil as a scarce resource. 
But the social structure that determines its exploitation fails to cater for the respective 
needs of all the parties involved simultaneously, thus creating a “mismatch between 
social structure and the value system” (Mitchell 1981:18).  
 
4.2.1 Interdependencies between Conflict Situation, Attitudes and Conflict 
Behaviour 
The three different components of a conflict (conflict situation, conflict attitudes, and 
perceptions and conflict behaviour) reciprocally influence each other following a 
triangular format: the conflict situation influences the attitudes and behaviour of parties; 
the attitudes and the behaviour in turn affect the initial conflict situation, and so on 
(Mitchell 1981:54-55). Put in the context of North-South Sudan, the situation of conflict 
that we have defined earlier as resulting from goal incompatibility between the 
government and local communities has, over the years, translated into actions from each 
side (behaviours) aimed at both achieving their respective goals and dissuading or 
preventing their opponents from achieving theirs. The government, for instance, views 
the SPLA’s actions as disruptive for social public order and the conduct of businesses. 
They are often portrayed as “greedy and unpatriotic” rebels seeking to take control of 
resources that belong to the state. In government circles, what is conceived as legitimate 
acts of protest by indigenous communities is often perceived as sabotage with the 
purpose of “illegally obtaining petroleum products and monetary compensation”. 
Therefore, there are feelings of mistrust and underlying antagonism between the two 
parties. The Southern Sudan population on the other hand, view the government as a 
northern-ethnic-group based plutocracy that has continuously deprived them from their 
right to enjoy the fruit of their land resources and whose oil policies have had 
catastrophic impacts on their livelihood.  
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These attitudes and perceptions have been accompanied by equally antagonistic 
behaviours which can be divided into two broad waves. In the first wave of behaviours 
following the conflict situation (starting at the end of the civil war), the victorious 
government backed by northern ethnic groups began to appropriate all the oil resources 
of the region through excessive centralisation and abusive concentration of power in the 
federal government. Therefore one may adopt a reciprocal position to Mitchell’s on the 
causes of conflict and assume that these attributes and the goals of the government have 
eventually drawn the two parties and their policies closer.  
 
This cyclical escalation of the conflict is not particularly odd, if one assumes with 
Mitchell (1981:48) that the translation of a conflict situation into violent behaviour often 
comes with a visible increase of hostile perceptions and attitudes between the opponents, 
which then go back to exacerbate the initial situation before the cycle repeats itself. This 
triadic conflict structure and the three inter-connected components that constitute it are in 
that sense essential to understand certain dynamics of a conflict such as the North-South 
conflict, where understanding the visible aspect of the conflict requires one to have a 
clear idea of what the parties’ goals are, and how do they affect their behaviour and 
perceptions of one another. However, a number of other aspects fall outside Mitchell’s 
theoretical framework, which may suggest either some limitations in his theory, or the 
exceptional nature of the North-South Sudan conflict.          
 
4.2.2 Triadic Structure of the North-South Sudan Conflict 
The triadic understanding of the structure of North-South Sudan reveals the 
incompatibility of goals that exists between the plutocratic ethnic-biased federal 
government of Omar al - Bashir and its multinational corporation allies on the one hand 
and the desire of local communities for better living conditions on the other hand. It also 
explains how the resulting conflict situation has translated into deep feelings of suspicion, 
hatred and hostility, and violent behaviours against one another. However, this theory 
presupposes that the conflict itself is simply incidental to the incompatibility of goals, 
which means that parties do not seek conflict as such, but merely pursue their specific 
goals. It is the incompatibility of goals that causes conflict.  
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The only problem is that in many cases, such as in the case of North-South Sudan, the 
conflict itself can become a goal as dynamics change and new parties with peripheral 
interests get involved over time. Originally, the North-South Sudan conflict involved the 
government, multinational corporations (MNCs) and frustrated local communities 
grouped in various associations and movements, such as the SPLA. Oil has transformed 
the basic parameters of North-South violence since the potential for oil developments 
entered political calculations in the mid-1970s. With the onset of large scale production 
over the past years, the oil rent has created new structures of profit, power and political 
control that have reshaped the capabilities of and incentives for key actors in the conflict.  
 
For all these new actors, the conflict itself has become a goal, a major source of income. 
Where does this category of actors stand in the author’s typology? Their conflict 
behaviour (if we may even refer to it as such) definitely does not seek to make “any party 
abandon or modify its goal” (Mitchell 1981:123). In this case, the distinction between the 
actor’s goal and the conflict itself is extremely blurred.  
 
Another objection that could be made against the triadic structure of conflict is the 
distinction that Mitchell makes between conflict over position and conflict over goods. 
Although the North-South Sudan conflict is over oil, to a large extent it also involves 
power and therefore position. The key point of the conflict is, as Mitchell puts it, the 
social structure, which is in this case the derivation system of redistribution of oil 
revenues used by the Sudanese Government. Control over resources or goods necessarily 
imply the power to make decisions regarding the allocation of these resources.  The 
marginalization of the southern communities, for instance, is only made possible because 
of the grip that northern ethnic groups have over the government.  
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The North-South Sudan conflict reveals that the triadic conflict structure constitutes a 
fairly reliable framework of analysis for conflicts in the sense that it allows for the clear 
understanding of the dynamic relationship between the sources of the conflict, the 
resulting psychological elements of it, and its materialisation into actors’ behaviours. 
However, its framing of the external dynamics of the conflict remain limited as it fails to 
account for the behaviours of actors whose goals do not necessarily clash with those of 
the main parties. The North-South Sudan conflict has over the years become a highly 
complex crisis with more parties, goals and interests than the initial ones. It seems like 
this complexity allows the limits of the triadic structure of conflict as a framework of 
conflict analysis to be uncovered. 
 
 However, the merit of this theory lies in the fact that it emphasises the deeper aspects of 
conflict and therefore goes beyond the actual visible violence that often derives from it. 
The north-south conflict definitely constitutes a clear example of how the conflicts are a 
lot more than their manifestations. Therefore, resolving the North-South Sudan conflict 
will require far greater commitment on the part of the federal government; in pursuing 
clearly defined objectives, coherently, within a framework that embraces a range of 
strategies that guide involvement of multiple actors at the international, regional, national 
and local levels. Whether such concerted action delivers peace will depend on the extent 
to which it provides political platforms and space for the Sudanese to air, process and 
decide the future of their country and on corporate stakeholders ensuring the oil industry 
operates fairly and transparently in the region, with visible benefits to the local 
population. Without serious and sustainable reforms, all parties stand to lose and 
encourage further instability in the region.  
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Having determined that the socio-economic dimension of the conflict is particularly 
pronounced in North-South Sudan, it necessitates the consideration of the socio-
economic dimension of the conflict during the formulation of peace agreements. Based 
on the premise that sound conflict resolution is built on the foundation of comprehensive 
analysis, it would follow that it is imperative to include the socio-economic dimension of 
conflict during the formulation of peace agreements. The next chapter will address the 
extent to which the socio-economic dimension of conflict has been taken into account in 
peace agreements.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to provide an answer to the following question: Does a lack of 
attention to the socio-economic element in peace agreements represent an obstacle in 
building a lasting peace in Sudan? If so, should the socio-economic dimension of the 
conflict in Sudan be taken into consideration during the formulation of peace agreements 
such as the CPA? 
 
 
5.2 THE ROLE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION IN PEACE             
AGREEMENTS 
 
In terms of observations made based on the more recent analysis of conflicts, natural 
resources have come to play a much more central role in conflicts and are closely linked 
to the issue of self-financing in conflicts. In addition to financing conflicts, resources 
have also impacted the dynamics of conflicts by creating problems in terms of command, 
control and cohesion of both rebel and government forces. The exploitation of natural 
resources also shapes strategies of power based on “the commercialization of armed 
conflict and the territorialisation of sovereignty around valuable resources areas and 
trading networks”(Thayer, 2002:1). Resources exploitation by groups in conflict is an 
important issue to take into consideration in terms of peace agreements in as much as it 
has an impact on certain actors’ interest in the continuation of conflict for profit. 
 
The socio-economic dimension of conflict should, however, not only be taken into 
account in as much as it manifests in terms of actors and issues, but also in terms of its 
impact on conflict dynamics. Thayer (2002:1) argues that internal conflicts have recently 
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become more protracted in nature and attributes this to the increased prominence of the 
socio-economic dimension which adds an additional dimension to conflicts, making them 
more complex and convoluted in terms of issues and actors. Chapter Two also provides 
an explanation for why conflicts persist or reoccur. This explanation is based on conflict 
theories, which take the socio-economic dimension of conflict into account. In 
accordance with the ‘greed approach’ to conflict, the central reason why conflicts become 
protracted is related to the profit opportunities created by conflict, which provide an 
incentive for certain groups or individuals to sustain the conflict. This notion is in stark 
contrast to the ‘grievance informed’ conviction that some societies experience repeated 
conflict due to the cumulative legacy of the desire for vengeance. 
 
Contemporary conflict theories have shifted the focus from a focus on states to a focus on 
groups as the primary actors in conflict. Conflict theory has also come to recognize the 
internal and transnational dimensions of recent conflicts. These shifts in focus should also 
inform the formulation of peace agreements in as much as they are based on observations 
made in terms of unfolding conflict dynamics and will contribute to the applicability, 
relevance and eventual success of such peace initiatives. 
 
 
5.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
After the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1982, and the resumption of war, the 
first attempt at resolving the conflict was made by Nigeria. Between 1991 and 1993, 
Nigeria sought in vain to bring the sides to an agreement. Steered by President 
Babangida, this initiative comprised the Abuja conference, held in July 1991, and 
subsequent negotiations in 1992 and 1993, all of which saw the positions of the two sides 
harden. At the heart of the disagreement was whether Sudan could be a theocratic or 
secular state (Boulden, 2003:191). 
 
The Khartoum Government refused to allow the option of self-determination for the 
south on the agenda of the negotiations and insisted on the maintenance of its Islamic 
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federal system, in which the south would be exempted from a few Islamic laws and 
punishments. Expressing this position, one of the government negotiators observed: “if 
referendum means referendum about separation or self-determination, we have to reject 
it” (Adar et al., 2004:65). The head of the delegation, Al Amin Khalifa, stated his 
position more bluntly: “Separation comes from the mouth of the gun and not by debate” 
(Adar et al., 2004:65). 
 
Following the collapse of the Abuja conference, after having made an initial unsuccessful 
attempt to mediate in the Somalia crisis, IGADD decided, at the request of Omar El 
Bashir in September 1993, to involve itself in the Sudan conflict. In November 1993, the 
first summit of IGADD Heads of States Peace Committee met in Kampala and set up a 
Ministerial Standing Committee on the Sudan conflict. Comprising the foreign ministers 
of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, this committee was mandated to draw up an 
agenda and program of work for a negotiated settlement to the Sudan conflict (Elnur, 
2009:45). 
 
The first session of the Standing Committee, held in March 1994, deliberated the 
principles that would underpin the framework for the search for peace, interim 
arrangements and the establishment of a humanitarian committee. In May 1994, a second 
session adopted a draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a basis for resolving conflict 
(Deng, 1997:35). The declaration identified four essential elements necessary to a just 
and comprehensive peace settlement. These were: a commitment by all parties to use 
peaceful means in resolving conflicts; respect for self-determination; the separation of 
religion from the state; the recognition of the heterogeneous nature of Sudan; and the 
promotion of Sudan as a democratic, secular state (Boulden, 2003:192). 
 
A third session of the Ministerial Standing Committee met in July 1994 to discuss the 
draft DOP. However, disagreement emerged on two critical issues: the question of 
separation of state and religion and self-determination of the south, about which the 
Government of Sudan continues to express reservations. Al Amin Khalifa, who headed 
the Sudanese delegation to Abuja, rejected the DOP and insisted that a referendum only 
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cover the future status of the south within Sudan. Even this minimal degree of support for 
a referendum caused the government to replace Khalifa with Ghazi Salah al-Din as the 
chief negotiator. When the fourth session of the Standing Committee was held in 
September 1994 to try and resolve these differences, the positions of both parties 
continued to polarize and harden. Salah Al-Din insisted that Sharia was “irreplaceable” 
and that self-determination lacked any legal or moral basis (Deng, 1997:36). This saw the 
talks break down. The absence of an authority to ensure compliance and the apparent 
inability of the regional states to enforce basic conditions for negotiations was to become 
the main obstacle to the progress of the Sudan process at this stage. 
 
Committed to moving the peace process forward, a summit of the IGADD Heads of 
States Peace Committee met shortly after adjournment to review the process and decide 
on the future course of action. Out of this summit came two decisions that were to form 
the basis for later action. Consensus was reached that the IGADD initiative should 
continue and that that the DOP should be the basis for negotiations. Arguing that it was 
“duty bound to ‘Islamize’ and ‘Arabize’ the whole Sudan,” the Government of Sudan 
rejected these decisions and withdrew from negotiations, stalling the talks for more than 
33 months (Boulden, 2003:193). 
 
In addition, following the 1996 agreement to change IGADD to IGAD, pressure was 
exerted on Sudan to comply with the spirit of the new IGAD. An Extra-Ordinary summit 
of IGAD on the Sudan problem was held in July 1997. At this meeting, the Government 
of Sudan accepted the DOP as the basis for discussion and withdrew its reservations on 
the issues of state and religion, and the self-determination of the south. However, it 
argued then, as it continues to do today, that the DOP document is not legally binding 
(Furley, 2006:68). While this move provided the much needed impetus to advance the 
peace process, the need for a structured approach to guide it quickly became apparent. 
 
To provide continuity in the peace process, an IGAD ministerial subcommittee on the 
Sudan Peace Process was constituted. At its first session, held in September 1997, the 
subcommittee mandated the IGAD Secretariat to seek external financial assistance to aid 
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negotiations, requested IGAD members to provide financial assistance, and 
recommended the establishment of a peace fund to sponsor the peace talks. Meanwhile, 
the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A agreed to cooperate fully in the search for a 
negotiated solution. Despite increasing eagerness to get the process going, the process 
stalled for the next six months. After intense lobbying, the second ministerial 
subcommittee was convened in May 1998, during which an agreement was reached that 
the borders of the “south” would be determined as they stood at independence on January 
1, 1956. The parties also agreed to observe a three-month cease-fire to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian relief. However, the issue of Islam remained contentious, as 
religion is deeply entrenched in the constitution of May 1998 and in the October 1999 
laws (Furley, 2006:69). 
 
Besides the parties to the conflict, several local and international actors have also signed 
on, and endorsed the DOP. The World Council of Churches, Care International, Doctors 
without borders, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
International Committee of the Red Cross, IGAD partners forum (comprising United 
States, Canada, Norway, Britain and Netherlands), the Coalition for Peace in the Horn- 
US and the Working Group on the Horn-Canada. In addition, the OAU and the UN 
expressed their support for the DOP (Boulden, 2003:194). 
 
The hope associated with these developments was quickly dashed after a connection was 
made between the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and Sudan’s 
support for Osama Bin Laden. Immediately after the attacks, the already fragile 
relationship between Sudan and most of the region deteriorated. Its relations with Kenya, 
a prime mover of the peace process, soured considerably. The regional context was made 
more complicated by the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998. 
Thus, after the third session of negotiations, in August 1998, the peace talks stalled, for 
nearly a year, until July 1999 when the fourth session was convened. This lull reinforced 
the realization that moving the process forward needed a permanent structure, beyond the 
ad hoc arrangements that characterized attempts until then, to engage on a continuous 
basis with all parties concerned. It was also agreed that a ministerial organ lacked the 
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time, leverage and capacity to sustain the momentum required for the peace process. To 
overcome this shortcoming, IGAD member-states established a permanent IGAD 
Secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process in July 1999. Chaired by Kenya, and based in 
Nairobi, the Secretariat was placed under Ambassador Daniel Mboya, who was made an 
IGAD Special Envoy. The Secretariat was mandated to create and coordinate technical 
committees to help move the peace process forward on a regular basis, within the 
framework of the DOP (Petterson, 2003:33). 
 
The Secretariat identified four primary areas for negotiations: the right to self-
determination for the people of Southern Sudan; self-administration for Southern Sudan; 
secularizing the constitution; and equitable sharing of resources among all Sudanese 
people. Four committees were constituted and are operating to address these issues. The 
SPLA leadership has proposed the formation of an African IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). 
Such a structure, they argued, would provide an opportunity to draw lessons beyond the 
immediate sub-region. Proposed members of such a forum are Nigeria, Egypt and South 
Africa, all seen as having the requisite experience to inform the Sudan peace process 
(Petterson, 2003:34). Further, these states are viewed as having the muscle to compel the 
Government of Sudan to engage in a “critical dialogue” about the war.  
 
 
5.4 LONG SLOG TO NAIVASHA  
 
Sudan in 2004/5 became the locus of remarkably intense international attention and 
activity which has brought into play a host of international mechanisms from the UN 
Security Council, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the African Union (AU) and its 
Peace Security Council, and the regionally based Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development. Sudan’s travails have also drawn in a range of key countries such as the 
United States, members of the European Union (EU), Libya, Egypt and Nigeria, all 
seeking a lasting solution to Sudan’s chronic instability and enduring anguish of the 
Sudanese people (Solomon, 2003:104). Despite this unprecedented breadth of 
international effort, the situation remains dangerous and profoundly unstable. 
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The Government of Sudan and its principal military adversary of more than 20 years, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), signed a comprehensive peace 
agreement, known as the Naivasha Comprehensive Peace Agreement (named for the 
Kenyan town in which the bulk of government-SPLM negotiations took place), on 9th
 
 
January 2005, putting an end to one of Africa’s bloodiest and longest-running civil wars. 
The agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council, which then authorized 10,700 
UN troops to monitor and enforce peace. A donors’ conference in Oslo in early April was 
likely to deliver billions of dollars in post conflict reconstruction assistance (Global Peace 
Operations, 2007). 
The January 2005, signing of the Naivasha agreement was the final step in more than two 
years of arduous and detailed negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM and its armed wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. These negotiations 
occurred under the auspices of the East African regional body, the IGAD, supported by a 
troika of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, ably mediated by Kenyan 
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. The final agreement, which incorporates 12 previously 
signed agreements and protocols, provides for a national government, with representation 
from both sides of the north-south conflict, and a separate Government of Southern 
Sudan. Current Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir would stay on as head of state, and 
SPLM leader John Garang would serve as first vice-president as well as head of the 
southern government (Global Peace Operations, 2007). 
 
The National Assembly will comprise specific percentages of the ruling National 
Congress Party (NCP), the SPLM, and other northern and southern political forces, with 
elections slated for the third year after signing. Revenues from southern oil fields would 
be evenly divided between Khartoum and the southern governments. With global oil 
prices at $55 per barrel, this would mean a massive inflow of funds (approximately $1 
billion in the first year) to the new southern government, which as yet has little in the way 
of financial infrastructure or administrative capacity (Strategic Survey, 2007). 
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On the security front, the agreement calls for an internationally monitored ceasefire with 
the UN peacekeepers (of which the UN authorized 10,700 in March 2005). The north and 
south will maintain separate armed forces, with integrated units of 21,000 soldiers (half 
SPLM, half government) to be deployed to sensitive areas, including the still disputed 
regions of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. Both north and south will 
maintain separate currencies, and Sharia law will remain applicable to Muslims in the 
north. The status of Sharia in the capital Khartoum will be determined by an elected 
assembly. The most immediate task will be to draft and adopt an interim national 
constitution, due 10 weeks after the signing. In April 2005, this process was already 
encountering difficulties and was behind schedule (Global Peace Operations, 2007). 
 
Despite the highly detailed character of the agreement, two critical factors, both intrinsic 
to the negotiation process itself, would present significant implementation challenges. 
Firstly, central to agreement is the stipulation that after a six year interim period, 
Southern Sudan, in partnership with the government, will organize an internationally 
monitored referendum in which the people of South Sudan will vote either to confirm the 
unity of Sudan or to secede. This provision is a major concession on the part of the 
government and was agreed upon early in the process, in Machakos Protocol of 20 July 
2002. It served two primary purposes. Firstly, it enshrined as the sine qua non of the 
negotiations and any eventual agreement the principle of self-determination for the south, 
and allayed southern fears that it would be pushed into an unfavourable political 
settlement or one which the government would fail to implement fully. Secondly, it 
provided an incentive to the Government of Sudan to strike a deal that would make unity 
attractive to the south and thus, at least in the initial six year post-conflict phase, makes 
every effort to redress southern grievances (Adar et al., 2004:69). 
 
The second difficulty is that, although Naivasha has been termed a north-south 
agreement, it is in fact a deal between an authoritarian, exclusivist regime and an 
authoritarian, exclusivity military movement, neither of which has shown much 
inclination or ability to represent or serve their purported constituencies. The legitimacy 
of the agreement as a national framework is therefore very much in question. In the north, 
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even within the government, hardliners and security hawks are deeply distrustful of the 
accord and are increasingly resistant as power and wealth sharing reduces political slots 
available to the NCP faithful and revenue allocations to the central government. Selling 
the accord to other northern interests will be even more contentious. The umbrella 
opposition group National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has announced a boycott of the 
constitutional review commission, claiming inadequate representation in that forum, and 
has expressed dissatisfaction with the 14% stake in government allocated to northern 
opposition groups. The percentage of political posts allocated may eventually set NDA 
members in competition with themselves and other northern groups. If or when, for 
example, the Government of Sudan cuts successive deals with the Darfurian rebel groups 
or the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan, pressures will amount to increase their 
representation in the National Government, creating greater strain with Khartoum, the 
NDA, or both. It is unclear whether the NCP or the SPLM would be willing to 
renegotiate the already agreed upon allocations (Ali & Matthews, 2004:56). 
 
These potentially destabilizing uncertainties and the difficult task of implementation that 
lies ahead should not detract from the historic step forward that the Naivasha agreement 
represents or the achievement of negotiating parties, the mediators and the concerted 
efforts of the international community (Ali & Matthews, 2004:58). The role of the United 
States, which brought to the table the leverage that previous mediation efforts had lacked, 
was critical in moving negotiations forward, impelled by three factors: powerful domestic 
US constituencies who viewed the conflict as an attack by an Islamist regime against the 
Christian populations of Southern Sudan; perceived shifts in Khartoum itself, including a 
newfound eagerness to end its international isolation, and the sidelining in 1999 of 
Bashir‘s mentor and rival, Islamist theoretician Hassan al Turabi; and an apparent 
willingness on the part of Khartoum to cooperate more fully on global counter-terrorism, 
a shift which preceded the attacks of 11 September, but became all the more important to 
US policymakers thereafter (Deng, 1997:39). 
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Those international and regional actors who pushed hardest for a process of negotiation 
did not presume that ending the north-south conflict, although a major achievement and 
desirable goal in itself would be a panacea for Sudan’s multiple ills. But a decision was 
made early on to give a political settlement to that war which had killed over two million, 
displaced over four million, and which had devastated Southern Sudanese society through 
brutal attacks and aerial bombardments of relief sites and civilian populations top priority 
(Adar et al., 2004:71). If that conflict continued to rage, there could be no progress 
anywhere in Sudan on human rights, political participation, economic decay and regional 
destabilization. The strategy of engaging the two principal combatants, the SPLM and the 
government, in negotiations was controversial when first proposed at the end of the 
Clinton administration, especially among the vocal and activist Sudan constituency in the 
United States, made up primarily of conservative evangelical Christians who considered 
negotiations with the Sudanese government an anathema. This constituency saw 
fundamental regime change in Khartoum as the only way forward, but short of major 
international (primarily American) military investment or intervention, offered few viable 
strategies for getting there. 
 
The Bush administration, which received strong electoral support from a conservative 
Christian base, adopted an approach that, while not entirely impartial, was nonetheless 
more pragmatic than ideological and more in line with the approaches of other key 
interested governments namely Norway, Kenya and the UK. The revitalized IGAD 
Process that resulted in 2002 was based on a strict prioritization of issues, the first being a 
negotiated settlement between the two chief protagonists and a sidelining of players, both 
external and internal, who might slow or impede that goal. This approach was ultimately 
successful in pushing the two sides to a settlement and in bringing Sudan one step closer 
to political transformation. But it also had serious costs, the most profound of which 
materialized in Darfur (Furley & May, 2006:67).   
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5.5 THE PROTOCOLS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT 
 
The peace agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM is unique 
in many ways, compared with other similar conflict situations. On the one hand, the GoS 
by no means represents a united north (as there are many military and political opposition 
factions), nor does the SPLA for the south (there are numerous political bodies not in 
agreement with the SPLM; also there are 32 military militias not all of them with the 
SPLA). Nor is the agreement an outcome of victory by one of the two contenders; it is in 
fact the result of a common understanding of the two parties that the conflict cannot be 
won on the battle-field and that the cost has been very high for both of them in many 
respects (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008:106). In the cases of, for example, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Congo, the ruling military and political systems completely 
collapsed at the hands of ‘rebels’. Hence, the GoS/SPLM agreement is a compromise of 
positions applying the principle of give and take under regional and, most importantly, 
international pressures came under extreme external, regional and international pressures 
to conclude the agreement and start implementing it as soon as possible. The agreement 
was finally signed in Nairobi, on 9 January 2005 (Strategic Surveys, 2007:264). 
 
Since the ultimate objective of the SPLM is to achieve full sustainable development in all 
the marginalized areas of Sudan, the agreement does not focus solely on political or 
security (military) issues. Power-sharing, especially in running the legislative, executive 
and judiciary systems, therefore occupies an important position in the protocols. In 
contrast, the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement was primarily concerned with the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Anya Nya fighting groups in 
regional government and symbolic representation at the national political level. The 
present Naivasha protocol on power-sharing stipulates that the SPLM (and its nominees) 
are to participate at both levels of government, the national and in the south, as the full 
partner of the present regime in the north. Implementation of the accords in general and 
participating in the power-sharing in particular presuppose a strong and capable public 
service system (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008:107). It is known that is not possible to attain 
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high standards of sustainable development without a well-founded, well-institutionalized, 
and harmonious bureaucratic system especially in post-conflict situations.  
 
Accordingly to Nhema and Zeleza (2008:107), the power-sharing protocol devotes a 
separate section to the civil service article 2.6. It states that the national civil service 
should be representative of the people of Sudan without discrimination against any 
qualified Sudanese on the basis of religion, ethnicity, region, gender or political beliefs. 
But it also declares that existing imbalances must be redressed through affirmative action, 
training and recruitment. The commission also has to ensure that 20-30% of the civil 
service, including middle and high level positions, goes to qualified people from South 
Sudan over the six year interim period. This might appear to be simple and 
straightforward, but it has to be seen in the wider perspective of both the protocols and 
realities of the Sudanese situation in order to appreciate the possible difficulties to be 
encountered. 
 
The protocols are premised on the complete restructuring of the executive, legislative and 
judiciary systems at all levels of government. It is intended that more powers and 
capacities be given to the states and local governments in all issues except matters of 
sovereignty (even these have been largely minimized by curtailing the powers of the 
president and the relevant ministers/ministries). There are to be four levels of 
government: the National Government, the Government of South Sudan, state 
governments, and local governments. Also, there will be a national assembly (parliament) 
and council of states (with representatives of the states) and a South Sudan Council. In 
addition to the national constitution (to be based on matters agreed upon in the protocols), 
every state will have its own constitution that should not be in opposition to the national 
one. Many commissions and committees (whose number has not yet been decided) will 
deal with matters mostly tackled at present by ministries, for example finance, natural 
resources, land, general and higher education, public service, etc. Equitable and fair 
representation of the people of South Sudan and other states of North Sudan in the 
commissions and other modalities should also include members of civil society as well. 
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Needless to say, management and facilitation implicit in the modalities mentioned require 
a good and high calibre administrative system (Strategic Survey, 2007:265). 
 
 
5.6 THE DEATH OF GARANG AND THE SPLM SUCCESSION 
     
Large crowds gathered to greet long-time SPLM/A leader John Garang’s inauguration as 
first vice-president of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum on 9 July 
2005, reflecting his status as a national figure. His death in a helicopter accident on 30 
July came as a profound shock, not just to the south but to the country as a whole. 
Subsequent riots in Khartoum and Juba demonstrated both the depth of this 
disappointment and the precariousness of the unity temporarily forged by the peace 
agreement (Strategic Survey, 2006:251). 
 
Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan was committed to unity for an 
interim period of six years, but the Southern Sudanese, whose leader Garang had been, 
may then vote to end that unity. Southern Sudan was to have an autonomous government.  
 
The SPLM/A quickly confirmed Garang’s deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, as the new head 
of the movement and he took over Garang’s positions as president of the Government of 
Southern Sudan (GoSS) and first vice-president in the GNU. There were concerns that he 
might lack the charisma and national stature of Garang, or the strength to keep the south 
together and hold his own against the National Congress Party (NCP). But while 
Garang’s death during this crucial transition period undoubtedly was a setback, Kiir’s 
accession also opened up new opportunities for the SPLM and the south (Strategic 
Survey, 2006:252).  
 
Kiir has a long military background. A veteran of the guerrilla movement of the first civil 
war, he was absorbed into the national army in 1972 and served in military intelligence. 
He was one of the original founders of the SPLM/A in 1983 and brought considerable 
organizational and military skills to the movement. As SPLA chief of staff in later years, 
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he forged a strong base in the army. He was one of the few SPLA commanders to support 
the grassroots peace movement that attempted to heal the rift in the south following the 
1991 SPLA split, and was the guarantor of the 1999 Wunlit peace conference between 
the Nuer of Western Upper Nile and the Dinka of Bahr el-Ghaza (his home region). He 
was also part of SPLM delegation at the Machakos talks in 2002 and negotiated the 
south’s right to self-determination, for which he was later branded a ‘separatist’. He also 
had differences with Garang over the democratic deficits in the movement and Garang’s 
reluctance to engage in a ‘South-South’ dialogue before concluding a peace agreement 
with Khartoum. These disagreements came to a head at a leadership meeting in Rumbek 
in November 2004, where he accused Garang of carrying the movement ‘in his own 
briefcase’. Many outside the SPLM hoped that Kiir would replace Garang as head of the 
SPLM/A, but in the end Kiir refused to split the movement, and the leadership supported 
his insistence on greater collective accountability (Strategic Survey, 2007:265). 
 
As president of the GoSS, Kiir had the opportunity to replace Garang’s patronage with 
his own in the appointment not only of his cabinet, but of the southern assembly and state 
governments as well. Instead, he maintained a balance by retaining many Garang 
loyalists in high positions and also instituted a more representative nomination system for 
lower levels of government. His greatest achievement so far was in making good on his 
earlier commitment to reconcile with the SPLM’s southern critics in particular, bringing 
Paulino Matip and the majority of the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) into the 
SPLA, and co-opting civilian critics (Strategic Survey, 2006:253). 
 
           
5.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CPA 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) concluded the peace process that had been 
ongoing since July 2002, and was a consolidation of all the previous agreements that had 
been signed over a long period of time (ACCORD, 2008:54).  
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The highlights of the CPA were: 
- Autonomy for the south for an interim period of six years, followed by a 
referendum in 2011, with the option of independence from Sudan. 
- The leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to be 
the first vice-president, and the SPLM/A to be given 28% of the seats in the 
National Government; 
- Sharia law to be applied only in the north and only to Muslims; 
- The oil revenues in the south to be divided equally between the north and the 
south; 
- The forces of National Government and the SPLM/A to remain separate, but 
integrated units of 21000 troops to be formed; 
- The government was given two and a half years to withdraw 91000 troops from 
the south, and SPLA eight months to withdraw its troops from the north; and  
- The north and the south to have separate banking systems and currencies 
(ACCORD, 2008:54).   
 
The main activities of the six-month pre-interim period following the signing of the CPA 
in January 2005 were drafting of an interim constitution, preparations for the deployment 
of the United Nations Monitoring Mission (UNMIS) peacekeeping force, and the 
formation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). The Interim National 
Constitution (INC) was signed into law on 9th
 
 July and the commission reported to the 
tripartite presidency on 14 July, but the SPLA’s preparations to receive UNMIS were 
behind schedule (Strategic Survey, 2006:253). 
Garang’s death delayed the formation of both the GNU and the GoSS. The distribution of 
ministries between the NCP and SPLM was the first showdown between Kiir and the two 
other members of the presidency, President Umar al-Bashir and second Vice President 
Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. The NCP retained control of the most important economic 
ministries, including finance and energy, leaving Kiir looking weak in the face of NCP 
intransigence. The GNU was finally appointed in September, and the GoSS and the 
southern state governments followed in October. Six of the nine national commissions of 
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the CPA (Assessment and Evaluation; Petroleum; Cease-fire Political; Fiscal and 
Financial Allocation and Monitoring; Judicial Service; and the Technical Ad Hoc Border 
Committee) were appointed in November 2005, but the remaining three (Human Rights, 
Civil Service, Land), and the six Southern commissions (Land; Civil Service; Human 
Rights; Anti-Corruption; Relief and Rehabilitation; Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration) were delayed. The National Constitutional Review Commission had not 
been convened by April 2006, causing a postponement of reviewing legislation to be 
brought in line with the INC. The old penal code, with its Islamic provisions, remained in 
force (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008:109). 
 
Most other state governments in the north, where power is shared between the NCP and 
SPLM, have been formed, but a deadlock over the constitution of Khartoum State was 
not resolved until May 2006 when the draft constitution was brought in line with the INC 
and the CPA at the SPLM’s insistence (Strategic Survey, 2006:254). 
 
There has been confusion over oil revenue transfers to the GoSS, the main element of the 
wealth sharing protocol of the CPA. Half of the oil revenues from Southern Sudan were 
supposed to go to the GoSS after 2% was paid to the government of the state in which the 
oil was produced. The GoSS doubted whether it was receiving its share, but had no 
means of verifying this. The GNU claimed to have transferred more than $700 million of 
2005’s revenues and more than $200 million to cover the first quarter of 2006. There 
were continuing disagreements between the governments over boundaries of oil 
producing areas, oil production figures and the status of oil contracts. The NPC, set up 
under the CPA to oversee and regulate the oil business, had been slow to convene (by 
May 2006 it had met just twice) and to pass relevant information on these issues to the 
GoSS (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008:110). 
 
Security arrangements are also sensitive. The Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006 
announced the integration of the majority of the SSDF into the SPLA, leaving only a 
small number of southern militias aligned with the northern-based government’s Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF) that have traditionally opposed the SPLA. The transfer of these 
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units has not gone smoothly, with reports of government forces attacking units of the 
SPLA aligned militias. There was also strong evidence that SAF continued to arm and 
supply anti-SPLA militias, who have been involved in attacks on civilians in Jonglei and 
Upper Nile states. The threat to rural security that these militias pose meant that many 
communities were unwilling to give up their weapons and resisted SPLA attempts to 
disarm them (Strategic Survey, 2006:255). 
 
A further threat to security was the continued presence of Joseph Kony’s LRA in 
Southern Sudan, having shifted their area of operation from south of Juba westwards 
towards the border of the DRC. There were reports of continued support for the LRA by 
elements of the SAF and Sudanese security personnel stationed in the south. Kiir and 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda announced a joint initiative in May 2006 to try to 
persuade Kony to negotiate an end to his insurgency (Strategic Survey, 2006:255).  
 
The withdrawal of SPLM and SAF forces from contested areas, their reduction in size 
and the demobilization of soldiers have also been proceeding slower than scheduled, and 
the formation of Joint Integrated Units for deployment in the south, Blue Nile, Southern 
Kordofan and Abyei was delayed. UNMIS’s ability to monitor force deployment was 
hampered by restrictions placed by Khartoum. Anxiety over security was reflected in the 
Southern Assembly’s allocation of $536 million, which is 40% of the south’s first budget 
to support of the SPLA (Global Peace Operations, 2007:31). 
 
The biggest long term challenge for the GoSS will be adopting and implementing 
effective social and economic policies, especially regarding the repatriation of an 
estimated four million refugees and internally displaced persons. In a country devastated 
by 22 years of war, with very little of the pre-war infrastructure left in place and almost 
no investment outside the oil industry, there are too many challenges to address at once. 
The southern government is suffering from the SPLM’s failure to draft a comprehensive 
reconstruction and development plan during the two year period of peace negotiations 
(ACCORD, 2008:55). 
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Quite apart from the challenge posed by the south, there was further uncertainty over the 
future of the three areas covered by protocols in the CPA. Abyei, straddling the 
Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal borderland and inhabited by the NgokDinka tribe, is supposed 
to come under the authority of the presidency throughout the interim period and is to vote 
in 2011 whether to remain in Kordofan or join the south. The territory included in the 
Abyei area was defined by the ABC, whose decision was to be “final and binding, and 
implemented with immediate effect” (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008:109). However, the NCP 
has refused to accept the ABC’s report, because it recognized Ngok claims to territory 
that include most of the area’s major oil fields. No civil authority has been appointed, 
Khartoum has restricted the movement of UNMIS forces in Abyei, and the NCP has tried 
to mobilize local opposition to the boundary decision. The assistant president, NCP had-
liner Nafi Ali Nafi, has been quoted as pledging that the Abyei Protocol will never be 
implemented. 
 
Another difficult issue in CPA implementation was the fate of the Nuba Mountains, 
which were re-incorporated into Southern Kordofan State, whose boundaries include all 
of former Southern Kordofan Province, thus assuring the Nuba Mountains a continued 
minority status. The SPLM and NCP have failed to agree on a state constitution, the main 
disagreement being over land issues. A caretaker government was established by the 
presidency in March 2006. There was a growing feeling among the Nuba people that they 
had been betrayed by the CPA. The formation of Blue Nile State in December 2005 was 
less problematic. But refugees returning from Ethiopian refugee camps were reportedly 
dismayed to learn that Blue Nile State was not part of Southern Sudan, and one SPLM 
state official warned that if the CPA was not implemented fairly the Blue Nile State 
assembly would vote to join the south. The dispute over Abyei, the oil fields and 
Southern Kordofan raised the prospect of bitter disputes over the boundaries of Southern 
Sudan, affecting who would have the right to vote in the self-determination referendum 
of 2011, what oil fields the south possessed and whether an agricultural scheme currently 
annexed to neighbouring northern states would be returned to the south. These 
boundaries will probably be hotly contested (ACCORD, 2008:56).       
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5.7.1 Challenges to Peace 
The CPA that ended the north-south conflict faced numerous difficulties relating to its 
implementation. Notably, aspects of the CPA relating to force redeployment, wealth 
sharing and power sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU) created by 
the CPA have not been implemented to the satisfaction of the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Recently, the SPLM 
withdrew from the GNU, citing the lack of implementation of the CPA as a primary 
concern (ACCORD, 2007:35). 
 
Further elements of the CPA such as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) of former combatants and road Security Sector Reform (SSR) remain to be 
implemented. The upward pressure faced on land, grazing, water and food resources by 
increasing volumes of returnees pose further threats to the development of sustainable 
peace in Southern Sudan (ACCORD, 2007:35). 
 
Outstanding contentious issues that have the potential to threaten the sustainability of 
peace building efforts in Southern Sudan include the holding of a national election in 
2009, and a referendum in the future status of Southern Sudan in 2011.  
 
 
5.8 INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
International backing for the CPA received a boost from the Oslo donors’ conference in 
April 2005, at which $4.5 billion was pledged for reconstruction. There was 
disappointment in the south, however, when it transpired early in 2006 that much of the 
funds were being diverted to the crisis in Darfur in western Sudan. Nevertheless, 
international agencies have begun to work with the GoSS on reconstruction and 
development. The World Bank and the US Agency for International Development are 
collaborating on a core Fiduciary Systems Support Programme. National and Southern 
Multi-Donor Trust Funds became operational in June 2005. The UN Development 
Programme is involved in a major town planning project in the south and numerous 
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NGOs are involved in both relief and developments projects. While this activity 
demonstrates the intention of the international community to be fully engaged in securing 
peace through results on the ground, it has yet to produce those results. Donors have been 
tardy in honouring their commitments, the Multi-Donor Trust Funds are subject to 
cumbersome World Bank bureaucratic procedures, and there has been a lack of tangible 
reconstruction (Strategic Survey, 2006:256). 
 
The formal declaration of peace opened the way for major new private investments, many 
of which will have political implications. Members of the Arab League are being 
encouraged to invest in the south, in order to help persuade southerners to vote for unity 
in 2011. Not all are supportive of the NCP, however. Kuwait has announced large-scale 
investment in Juba, possibly in recognition of the public backing southerners gave 
Kuwait during the Gulf War, in which Khartoum supported Iraq. By far the most visible 
new investors in the south are Ugandan, Kenyan and South African merchants and 
businessmen, and these economic ties with African countries are set to grow (Strategic 
Survey, 2006:256).  
 
The oil industry will attract the most substantial investment, as further oil blocks in the 
south become safe for exploitation. Confusion still exists over oil concessions granted 
prior to the signing of the CPA. Both the SPLM and the SSDF claim to have extended 
concessions to different oil companies for rights Khartoum had granted to France’s Total. 
But China is the main international player in Sudan’s oil and will remain so for some 
time (Strategic Survey, 2006:257). 
 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
 
From the discussion it is apparent that Sudanese domestic actors and the international 
community have only superficially included the socio-economic dimension in the peace 
process. Socio-economic interests have thus not been ignored; instead they have 
integrated into the peace process and become a virtual “hidden script”. One of the 
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possible reasons why the socio-economic dimension was not initially integrated into the 
peace process to a greater extent was the lack of public awareness of the impact of socio-
economic interests. Additional reasons are the way in which the conflict is 
conceptualized – major actors involved in the conflict still view the conflict as primarily 
hinging on security issues with socio-economic issues featuring as a less central 
dimension – and the fact that actors do not openly admit their socio-economic interests 
and might even withdraw from the negotiations if forced to table their socio-economic 
stake in the conflict. 
 
Finally, it should be considered whether or not one can attribute the lack of attention 
given to the socio-economic dimension in peace agreements to the persistence of the 
conflict. The focus on security and political issues as opposed to the socio-economic 
dimension does play a role in the protracted nature of the conflict, but a number of related 
issues also have a bearing on the conflict dynamics. At the heart of the dilemma is the 
fact that lack of attention given to the socio-economic dimension reflects the manner in 
which the conflict is conceptualized.   
 
Equitable distribution of resources is among the focal points of conflict in North – South 
Sudan. However, in order to resolve the conflict in North – South Sudan permanently, the 
issue of equitable distribution of resources must be given considerable attention. The 
government and the oil companies should plough back their excess revenue and profits 
into the human resources development, infrastructure amenities and establishing 
industries which will help to provide gainful employment for grassroots people of North 
– South Sudan. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is built on the underlying assumption that the shortcomings of many peace 
agreements are rooted in the failure to adequately consider and incorporate the socio-
economic dimension of conflict. Using this assumption as a point of departure, this study 
explored the hypothesis that a thorough understanding and recognition of the role of the 
socio-economic dimension in conflict would contribute to the resolution of conflict if 
incorporated during the formulation of peace agreements.  
 
This study aimed to explore the assumption through a discussion of theoretical 
approaches to the conflict socio-economic nexus, an analysis of the extent to which 
theory accounts for the conflict reality in North-South Sudan and finally, determining to 
what degree peace agreements in North-South Sudan have taken the socio-economic 
dimension and insight gained from the academic exploration of this topic into account 
during their formulation. The research question at the core of this chapter is: What 
recommendations can be made in terms of taking the socio-economic dimension of 
conflict into account? The next section will revisit the conclusions that were reached in 
the preceding chapters. The discussion in the next section will contextualize the 
recommendations to be made hereafter by outlining the development of the argument for 
the inclusion of the socio-economic dimension in peace agreements.  
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6.2 SUMMARY OF PRIOR CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter Two explored the extent to which contemporary conflict theories can be viewed 
as a response to the changing conflict context and a departure from previous conflict 
theories. The following paragraphs list the conclusions that were drawn.   
 
Chapter Three provided an overview of the geographical and historical context in which 
the conflict in North-South Sudan is rooted as a means of contextualizing the discussion 
in Chapter Four. The purpose of Chapter Four was to evaluate how well theory and 
reality match as far as the conflict reality in North-South Sudan is concerned. The 
information on the conflict reality in North-South Sudan presented in Chapter Four 
reflected on the theories and concepts concerned with the socio-economic dimension of 
conflict described in Chapter Two.  
 
Chapter Four determined that the socio-economic dimension of the conflict is particularly 
pronounced in North-South Sudan and that the socio-economic dimension plays a 
prominent enough role in the North-South Sudan conflict to warrant inclusion in the 
overall characterization of the conflict. In accordance with the hypothesis that the 
consideration of the socio-economic dimension is imperative for the success of peace 
initiatives, the extension of the findings in Chapter Four is that the socio-economic 
dimension should be considered in terms of the formulation of peace agreements. The 
necessary consideration of the socio-economic dimension of the conflict during the 
formulation of peace agreements is advocated based on the premise that sound conflict 
resolution is built on the foundation of comprehensive analysis. Based on the analysis of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreements falling within the perimeters of this study, it was 
established in Chapter Five that the socio-economic dimension of conflict is not 
sufficiently incorporated into the formulation of peace agreements initiatives in North-
South Sudan. 
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF CONFLICT INITIATIVES IN NORTH-
SOUTH SUDAN  
 
After years of intensive negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A was signed in January 2005. The 
agreement provided for power sharing, the distribution of oil earnings, and a referendum 
on national unity to be held in 2011. Hopes for successful peace implementation have 
been dimmed by the death of SPLM leader John Garang in a plane crash in August 2005, 
less than a month after he was sworn in as Sudan’s vice-president under the terms of the 
CPA (ICG, 2006). Clashes along the north-south border have continued despite the 2005 
accord and have killed hundreds of people in the past year. A lack of discipline among 
ex-rebels and pro-Khartoum militias means fighting can easily flare up.  
 
The failure to prevent the polarization of the conflict during this stage of Sudanese 
politics can be attributed to the lack of political will and the incapacity of the political and 
socio-economic process to resolve the key issues in the North-South Sudan conflict. The 
dynamics of the conflict at this period are important because they highlight the core early 
warning factors that have to be genuinely addressed if conflict prevention and, ultimately, 
resolution is to be achieved.  
 
6.3.1 Power and Wealth Sharing 
The CPA is, at its core, a deal between two political military elites. The personal 
connection between John Garang and Ali Osman Taha, the architects of the peace 
agreement who later became vice presidents in the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), was to be the driving force of implementation. The death of Garang in mid 2005 
resulted in the erosion of relations between the two parties. Taha has been weakened by 
hard-liners in the NCP who have felt cornered by international pressure due to the 
situation in Darfur. Meanwhile, the SPLM, under its new leader, Salva Kiir, seems 
unwilling or unable to confront the NCP. Neither side is working hard “to make unity 
attractive”, the guiding CPA principal (Global Peace Operations, 2007:32). Few of the 50 
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commissions called for in the agreement function well, if at all. Matters are often referred 
to the presidency, but remain unresolved. 
 
The net result is an impasse on three issues that could make or break the peace process, 
all of which centre on oil: Abyei, delineation of the north-south boundary, and the sharing 
of oil revenues. The first is the most volatile. Abyei sits in an oil rich region that straddles 
the north and south, and will be critical to both sides after the referendum that is 
scheduled for 2011. 
 
The ability of the United Nation Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) to impact the resolution of 
these issues is constrained by its lack of presence in the commissions and committees set 
up to deal with them. This is part of a larger problem. Under the CPA, the parties agreed 
to deal with most matters bilaterally. The UN can cajole and offer advice, but unless the 
parties are receptive, there is little more it can do. The NCP in particular has been stalling 
on implementation of the CPA, and has little interest in turning to the UN for help in 
resolving its disputes with the SPLM. The heavy international focus on Darfur 
throughout the year only caused the NCP to harden its stance. Meanwhile, UNMIS has 
been urging the SPLM to become more assertive in the CPA commissions, and more 
generally in the GNU “partnership”, but to no avail. The SPLM, reportedly experiencing 
serious internal divisions, seems to lack both the capacity and inclination to reverse the 
NCP’s stalling and its determination to limit UNIMIS’s role (Global Peace Operations, 
2007:33). 
 
6.3.2 Identity Issue 
Perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned from the Sudanese case is the difficulty 
of managing or resolving identity conflicts. Since identity issues are deep rooted and 
exceedingly sensitive, they are difficult even to discuss, let alone to resolve. The 
tendency on the part of those who dominate the status quo is to deny the essence of the 
problem and give it more palatable labels which, while pertinent, represent partial truth at 
best and distortions at worst. When the Northern Sudanese point at their dark skin colour 
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and say that race is not a problem, claiming that they are Arabs only culturally, they 
appear to be correct on the face of things (Deng, 1997:27).  
 
But they conceal, even deliberately, that Sudanese Arabs do indeed believe themselves 
genetically Arab, take exceeding pride in the Arab ancestry, and look down on the 
African heritage. In any case, even if the issue were culture and not race, cultural 
chauvinism should not be any more acceptable than racial bigotry. When race, culture 
and religion are merged into a composite identity which is then projected to define the 
nation, the crisis becomes a zero-sum contest for the soul of the nation (Deng, 1997:28). 
 
Under those circumstances, even diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict 
tend to shy away from the embittering truth because it points to the path to failure. And 
yet, the problem cannot be wished away and solutions based on half-truths are not likely 
to endure. In a sense, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was an ambivalent attempt to 
resolve the national identity crisis in that it recognized the south as racially, religiously 
and culturally different from the north and accommodated it as such. This was done by 
giving the south a corner in the country, while leaving the national framework still 
defined and dominated by the Arab-Islamic identity of the north, with only marginal, 
largely symbolic gestures toward the south at the centre (Deng, 1997:28). 
 
While the case of Sudan, as was the case in apartheid South Africa, is extreme in degree, 
most, if not all, African countries confront crises of identity in varying degrees. 
Generally, African countries deal with these identity crises through pragmatic policies of 
relatively equitable distribution. Otherwise, no doctrine or formula has been developed 
for resolving or managing conflicts of identity. The dilemma Africans face is to recognize 
and build upon their diverse regionally defined ethnic entities and risk fostering 
divisiveness and impeding national integration or deny their existence, not only as 
demand making groups, but also as assets or resources for national building and 
promoting self-sustaining development from within. This dilemma cannot be resolved by 
oblivion, but rather by dialogue and sincerity in addressing the problem involved (Deng, 
1997:28). 
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Along the same lines, diplomatic intercession that seeks quick fixes in addressing such 
complex issues can only complicate the crisis. There is a tendency on the part of 
diplomatic peacemakers to look for aspects of a problem that lend themselves to 
relatively easy solutions and to postpone more difficult ones. While this is 
understandable, and perhaps even practical, it is probably the more difficult one that 
eventually provokes people to violent confrontation, making them determined to kill and 
risk being killed. 
 
Are identity conflicts as unmanageable as they are generally perceived? The answer 
probably depends on how available options are framed. If the only options are that one 
identity group is excluded from the collective framework, or forced to deny its existence 
through discriminatory policies and practices, then of course neither of these can be 
acceptable. If, on the other hand, the options are framed in terms of redefining the 
national framework in a way that will allow all nationals to qualify equally as citizens 
with a sense of pride in belonging on relatively equitable footing, share power and 
national resources as identifiable groups with the common goal of preserving national 
unity, co-exist in a pluralistic framework that ensures mutual respect and relative 
equality, or as a fourth option, part ways amicably and seek cooperative bases of relating 
to one another as friendly neighbours, then these ought to offer a discussible range of 
options (Deng, 1997:29). 
 
What the Sudanese situation calls for, and which is a lesson that can be learnt from 
experience, is a sustained dialogue aimed at openly and courageously addressing the 
nature of the relations and ways of readjusting them to make and sustain peace.  
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6.3.3 Recommendations 
Therefore, the following recommendations are proffered to control conflict in North-
South Sudan
 
 and regenerate the region’s dwindling forest resources.  
• Political Dialogue: The Federal Government should engage the people of the 
region in a sustained and honest dialogue, and create mutual trust and confidence, 
which would allow it to address the grievances of the people in the troubled 
region.  
• Community Development: Oil producing companies operating in North-South 
Sudan
 
 should accelerate community development by alleviating poverty and 
promoting social equity. They should also adopt the best practices approach to oil 
exploration and production, minimizing oil spillage and abolishing gas flaring 
(ICG, 2006). 
The resolution of conflict is a distractive activity that deserved special attention. As a 
result of increasing devastation of the environment of the North-South Sudan region, it is 
imperative that efforts to resolve violent conflict in North-South Sudan should be based 
on the aspiration and needs of the people. Genuine conflict resolution effort in North-
South Sudan can be achieved by popular participation, equitable distribution of resources, 
environmental sustainability and free flow of information (ICG, 2006). 
 
Moreover, popular participation or public cooperation is perhaps the most important 
condition for the success of conflict resolution. It is the petrol of economic development; 
it involves decentralization of planning and a dynamic force that makes almost all things 
possible.  
 
However, to achieve permanent conflict resolution development there is a need to seek 
for popular participation of the people (North-South Sudan) and the only way to do that is 
to make the people of North-South Sudan part and parcel of the planning process, by 
involving them in the formulation and implementation of the plan that affects them. They 
should be consulted about their needs and aspirations. Discussion should be held with the 
 97 
people to enlighten them with available resources and how their needs should be met. 
Thus, there would be a favourable atmosphere for effective operation of the oil 
companies in the region, since the people now see themselves as part and parcel of the 
system and will do everything humanly possible to protect the system (ICG, 2006). 
 
Notwithstanding the contribution of the oil sector to the Sudanese economy, for there to 
be a permanent conflict resolution in North-South Sudan, oil and gas activities in the 
region must be regulated to make them more environmentally friendly. Thus, the 
following policies and strategies should be adopted and implemented. 
Strict environmental standards for air, land and water pollution should be enforced. The 
environmental protection agency should be strengthened for this task; market based 
instruments like pollution taxes and effluent charges should be utilized. Revenue obtained 
from pollution taxes should be ploughed back into developmental projects or used to 
compensate the inhabitants of the North-South who have suffered as a result of 
environmental damage. An attempt should be made to mainstream environmental 
concerns in national economic policies.  
 
This will promote the visibility and sustainability of environmental policies. Information 
on how funds are being disbursed, the amount, projects meant for and those entrusted 
with the funds. Furthermore, where the projects are to be sited and the date of 
implementation and completion should be made known to the people, in order to ensure 
accountability and transparency. This process comes after the people have been consulted 
about their needs and aspirations. Thus, collation and dissemination of information as it 
relates to the region should be given considerable attention in order to achieve a 
permanent conflict resolution in the north-south region (ICG, 2006). 
 
Therefore, resolving the North-South Sudan conflict will require far greater commitment 
on the part of the federal government in pursuing coherent and clearly defined objectives, 
within a framework that embraces a range of strategies that guide involvement of 
multiple actors at the international, regional, national and local levels. Whether such 
concerted action delivers peace will depend on the extent to which it provides political 
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platforms and space for the Sudanese to air, process and decide the future of their 
country. Without serious and sustainable reforms, all parties stand to lose and encourage 
further instability in the region.  
 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The current conflict in North-South Sudan is firmly embedded within a geographical 
context but more so in a historical context. South Sudan in particular has been badly 
affected given that it has, as result of a bitter historical memory and colonial legacy of 
separate development, remained resistant to racial, cultural and religious assimilation into 
the Arab-Islamic model of the north. Successive liberation movements in the south 
continue to oppose the imposition of the racial, cultural, linguistic and religious elements 
of identity on the whole country. 
 
The North-South Sudan conflict presents a special challenge within the country and the 
international community in general. With the exception of the 10 year period of peace 
that resulted from the Addis Ababa Accords, the country’s post independence politics 
have been characterized by a devastating war of visions that still needs an acceptable 
solution. 
 
The north-south CPA was no doubt a landmark achievement for Sudan. There are, 
however, several critical challenges that face Sudan. In the north various forces and 
Islamist groups, which have had a firm grip on the Sudanese state, fear the CPA 
particularly the clauses of self-determination and wealth sharing. In the south, there are 
problems of capacity to establish and empower structures of governance, as well as 
transformation of the SPLM from a guerrilla movement to a government. There are also 
problems of armed groups and second tier conflicts which can easily hamper the 
operations of the GoS. Indeed the nexus between the north-south conflicts leads to the 
conclusion that Sudan’s crisis is a conflict between the centre and the periphery. Lastly, 
there is the divergence between the perceptions of the various international players such 
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as the AU, UN, EU, and governments such as the US, China and Middle East states 
regarding the Sudan crisis. A major challenge is not to just narrow this divergence, but to 
determine how to resolve the Sudan conflicts conclusively without fragmenting the 
country.  
 
Despite various challenges, the CPA is still on course. Such challenges include the lack 
of capacity in the south, tensions between unionists and secessionists within the SPLM/A 
and the ongoing war in the western Darfur region, which has attracted much international 
attention.  
 
Solomon (2003:132) argues that the success of any future conflict prevention initiative 
will depend on the degree to which these factors are handled. The country has emerged as 
two separate entities, characterized by separate conceptions of the national framework, 
competing identities, separate levels of economic development, separate world outlooks 
and bitter historical and contemporary memories of conflict and war; the marginalization 
of the south in the country’s political, social and economic set-up, and the perceived 
imposition of a dominant Arabic Islamic identity framework over the rest of the country; 
a dominant northern national identity framework, based on Islamism and Arabism; and 
lack of confidence on the part of the south, in the country’s political and legal 
institutions, practices and processes. 
 
What is required is a deliberate process in which both parties confront the deeper issues, 
and re-frame the conflict in such a way that it provides for a carefully facilitated 
discussion, to accommodate each other’s perspectives, and seek solutions that will not 
only be lasting, but also realistic.  
 
Moreover, new approaches to regional and international conflict management are 
required to deal with the changing nature of violent conflict in Africa. The socio-
economic dimension of conflict should not only be taken into account in as much as it 
manifests in terms of actors and issues but also in terms of its impact on conflict 
dynamics. Thayer (2002:1) argues that internal conflicts have recently become more 
 100 
protracted in nature and attributes this to the increased prominence of the socio-economic 
dimension, which adds an additional dimension to conflicts, making them more complex 
in terms of issues and actors.  
 
In addition, the North-South Sudan conflict reveals that the triadic conflict structure 
constitutes a fairly reliable framework of analysis for conflicts the sense that it allows for 
the clear understanding of the dynamic relationship between the sources of the conflict, 
the resulting psychological elements of it and its materialisation into actors’ behaviours. 
However, its framing of the external dynamics of the conflict remain limited as it fails to 
account for the behaviours of actors whose goals do not necessarily clash with those of 
the main parties. The North-South Sudan conflict has over the years become a highly 
complex crisis with more parties, goals and interests than the initial ones. It seems like 
this complexity has allowed us to uncover the limits of the triadic structure of conflict as 
a framework of conflict analysis. 
 
 However, the merit of this theory lies in the fact that it emphasizes the deeper aspects of 
conflict and therefore goes beyond the actual visible violence that often derives from it. 
The north-south conflict definitely constitutes a clear example of how the conflicts are a 
lot more than their manifestations. Therefore, resolving the North-South Sudan conflict 
will require far greater commitment on the part of the federal government in pursuing 
clearly defined objectives, coherently, within a framework that embraces a range of 
strategies that guide involvement of multiple actors at the international, regional, national 
and local levels. Whether such concerted action delivers peace will depend on the extent 
to which it provides political platforms and space for the Sudanese to air, process and 
decide the future of their country; and for corporate stakeholders to ensure the oil 
industry operates fairly and transparently in the region, with visible benefits to the local 
population. Without serious and sustainable reforms, all parties stand to lose and 
encourage further instability in the region.  
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Therefore, the preceding sections have shed light on the two research questions identified 
as being at the core of this study. In terms of the extent to which the analysis of the socio-
economic dimension of the conflict in North-South Sudan supports and correlates with 
contemporary conflict theories, it can be concluded that the conflict reality in North-
South Sudan, for the most part, supports contemporary theories of the socio-economic 
dimension of conflicts. 
 
Having determined that the socio-economic dimension of the conflict is particularly 
pronounced in North-South Sudan, it necessitates the consideration of the socio-
economic dimension of the conflict during the formulation of peace agreements. Based 
on the premise that sound conflict resolution is built on the foundation of comprehensive 
analysis, it would follow that it is imperative to include the socio-economic dimension of 
conflict during the formulation of peace agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
 
ACCORD, 2008. Conflict Resolution in Sudan. Conflict Trends. Issue 3. The African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. 
 
Adar, K. Nyuot Yoh, J & Maloka, E. 2004. Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future 
Prospects. Africa Institute of South Africa.  
 
Akerlund, A. 2001. Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace. Experience and Ideas of 
Swedish Civil Society Organisations. Sida Studies.  
 
Ali, T & Matthews, R. 2004. Durable Peace. Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. 
University of Toronto Press 
 
Ampiah, K. & Naidu, S. 2008. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China. 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Amstutz, M. 1982. An Introduction to Political Science. The Management of Conflict. 
Scott, Foresman and Company. 
 
BBC NEWS. 2008. Country Profile: Sudan. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm. Accessed on 1st 
March 2009.  
 
Bercovitch, J. 1984. Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution. 
Westview Press. 
 
Binns, D. 1977. Beyond the Sociology of Conflict. Macmillan Press. 
 
 103 
Bloomfield, L. & Moulton, A. 1997. Managing International Conflict. From Theory to 
Policy. A Teaching Tool Using CASCON. St. Martin’s Press. New York.  
 
Boulden, J. 2003. Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional 
Organizations. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Burton, J. 1990. Conflict: Resolution and Provention. St. Martin’s Press, New York. 
 
Cobbold, R. & Mills, G. 2004. Global Challenges and Africa. Bridging Divides, Dealing 
with Perceptions, Rebuilding Societies. Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue SAIIA.  
 
Coser, L. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. The Free Press. Glencoe, Illinois. 
 
Coser, L. 1957. “Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change.” British Journal of 
Sociology 8: 197-207 
 
Coser, L. 1961. “The Termination of Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 5: 347-53. 
 
Dahrendorf, R. 1959. Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society. Routledge. 
London. 
 
Dahrendorf, R. 1958. “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 2: 170-83 
 
Day, R & Doyle, W. 1986. Escalation and Intervention. Multilateral Security and Its 
Alternatives. Westview Press.  
 
Deng, F. 1997. Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Sudan. Preventive Diplomacy Series 
1. ACCORD.  
 
Elnur, I. 2009. Contested Sudan. The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction. 
 
 104 
Furley, O. 1995. Conflict in Africa. Tauris Academic Studies.  
 
Furley, O & May, R. 2006. Ending Africa’s Wars. Progressing to Peace. Ashgate.  
 
Gurr, R. 1968. “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New 
Indices.” American Political Science Review 62 (December): 11 04-24 
 
Gurr, R. 1972. “The Calculus of Civil Conflict”. Journal of Social Issues 28: 27-48. 
 
Global Peace Operations, 2007. United Nations Mission in Sudan. Annual Review of 
Global Peace Operations. 
 
Hauss, C. 2001. International Conflict Resolution. Continuum. London.  
 
Henderson, H. 1971. “Toward Managing Social Conflict.” Harvard Business Review 45 
(Mach-April): 82-90.  
 
Himes, J. 1980. Conflict and Conflict Management. The University of Georgia Press. 
Athens. 
 
ICG, 2006. Sudan. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1230&l=1. Accessed 
on 5th
 
 April 2009.  
Imobighe, T. 2003. The OAU (AU) and OAS in Regional Conflict Management: A 
Comparative Assessment. Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan. Abuja.  
 
Jeong, H. 1999. Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure. Institute for 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
 
Keating, T & Knight, A. 2004. Building Sustainable Peace. United Nations University 
Press.  
 105 
 
Kirton, J. & Stefanova, R. 2004. The G8, the United Nations, and Conflict Prevention. 
Ashgate.  
 
Korzenny, F & Toomey, S. 1990. Communicating for Peace. Diplomacy and 
Negotiation. Sage Publications, London 
 
Kriesberg, L. 1973. The Sociology of Social Conflicts. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey. 
 
Meckenkamp, M. Tongeren, P. & Van de Veen, H. 1999. Searching for Peace in Africa. 
An overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities. European Platform for 
Conflict Prevention and Transformation Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
 
Mitchell, C.R. 1981. The structure of international conflict. London, McMillan Press Ltd.  
 
Mwaura, C & Schmeidi, S. 2002. Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn 
of Africa. The Red Sea Press, Inc. 
 
Mwagiru, M. 2006. Conflict in Africa. Theory, Process and Institutions of Management. 
CCR Publications. 
 
Nhema, A & Zeleza, P. 2008. The Resolution of African Conflicts. The Management of 
Conflict Resolution & Post-Conflict Reconstruction. UNISA Press. 
 
Nhema, A & Zeleza, P. 2008. The Roots of African Conflicts. The Causes & Costs. 
UNISA Press.  
 
Oberschall, A. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey. 
 
Petterson, D. 2003. Inside Sudan. Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Revised and 
Updated. Westview Press. 
 106 
 
Pfetsch, F. 2007. Negotiating Political Conflict. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Pruitt, D. & Rubin, J. 1986. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 
 
Ramsbotham, O. Woodhouse, T & Miall, H. 2005. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 
The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 2nd
 
 edition. Polity.  
Schneider, G & Weitsman, P. 1997. Enforcing Cooperation. Risky States and 
Intergovernmental Management of Conflict. Macmillan Press Ltd.  
 
Silva, M. & Samarasinghe, R. 1993. Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict. A Publication of 
the International Centre for Ethnic Studies. Pinter Publishers, London.  
 
Solomon, H. 2003. Towards Sustainable Peace. The Theory and Practice of Preventive 
Diplomacy in Africa. Africa Institute of South Africa. 
 
Sorbo, G & Vale, P. 1997. Out of Conflict from War to Peace in Africa. Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. 
 
Sudan Ministry of Environment and Physical Development. 2003. http://www.mof-
sudan.net/. Accessed 14th
 
 August 2009. 
Sriram, C. & Nielsen, Z. 2004. Exploring Subregional Conflict. Opportunities for 
Conflict Prevention. Boulder, London.  
 
Strategic Survey. 2003/4. Sudan’s Deceptive Transformation. The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies. Oxford Press. Pg 321-328. 
 
 107 
Strategic Survey. 2006. War and Peace in Sudan. The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. Oxford Press. Pg 251-260. 
 
Strategic Survey 2007. Somalia and Sudan: a Web of Conflicts. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford Press. Pg 253-268. 
 
Taiser, A & Matthews, R. 2004. Durable Peace. Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. 
University of Toronto Press.  
 
Thayer, H. 2002. The Political Economy of War and Peace [online]. Available: 
http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseEcon_body_07.htm [Accessed 
20th September 2009]. 
 
UNEP. 2007. Sudan Post Conflict Environmental Assessment.  
http://www.unep.org/publications/search/pub_details_s.asp?ID=3949. Accessed 5th
 
 
September 2009.  
Vayrynen, R. 1991. New Directions in Conflict Theory. Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation. SAGE Publications. London. 
 
Wallensteen, P. 2007. Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global 
system. 2nd
 
 edition. SAGE Publications. London. 
Walraven, K. 1998. Early Warning and Conflict Prevention. Limitations and 
Possibilities. Kluwer Law International. The Hague. 
 
Williams, R. 1972. Conflict and Social Order: A Research Strategy for Complex 
Propositions. “Journal of Social Issues 28: 11-27. 
 
World Bank. 2006. Reports from the first Sudan Consortium. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANE
 108 
XTN/0,,contentMDK:20856028~menuPK:2347748~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theS
itePK:375422,00.html. Accessed 20th
 
 September 2009. 
Zartman, W. 1995. Elusive Peace. Negotiating an end to Civil Wars. The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, .D.C.  
 
Zartman, W. & Faure, G. 2005. Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Cambridge University  Press. 
 
Zartman, W. 2007. Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. 
United States Institute of Peace.  
 
 
